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Professional Responsibilities of Co-Counsel:
Joint Venturers or Scorpions in a Bottle?
Douglas R. Richmond
INTRODUCTION
M AINE lawyer Terrance Duddy surely thought that he had found gold
in the Rockies. His client, Albert Wooster, had been injured in a
head-on collision on a Wyoming highway in which the other party's driver
was plainly at fault for crossing the center line.' The other party was clearly
capable of satisfying any judgment that Wooster might receive. Duddy
accordingly arranged for Wyoming lawyer Robert Horn to prosecute
Wooster's personal injury claim in Wyoming state court and, as part of the
deal, contracted with Horn to share in Horn's contingent fee to be paid out
of Wooster's expected recovery.3 Unfortunately, Horn missed a required
statutory filing and Wooster therefore lost at summary judgment.4 When
Duddy sued Horn for legal malpractice to recover for his lost fee, he
fared no better. Fearing the prospect of "unseemly squabbling between
attorneys that could erode the public's confidence in the legal system"
and the compromise of clients' interests because of the "self interests of
feuding attorneys," the Wyoming Supreme Court declined to recognize a
cause of action for legal malpractice between co-counsel.5
Consider further the unfortunate conduct of a relatively inexperienced
New Mexico lawyer, Michele Estrada.6 In a nutshell, Estrada committed
serious discovery misconduct and introduced a forged prescription into
evidence in a pharmacy malpractice case.7 She did so principally because
of forceful instruction by her client's national counsel.' Estrada allowed
herself to be guided by the client's national counsel even though he was
not her supervisor, did not share her ethical duties because he was not
admitted to practice in New Mexico, and did not enter his appearance in the
i Senior Vice President, Global Professions Practice, Aon Risk Services, Chicago, Illinois.
J.D., University of Kansas; M.Ed., University of Nebraska; B.S., Fort Hays State University.
Opinions expressed herein are the author's alone.
2 Horn v. Wooster, 165 P.3d 69,70-71 (Wyo. 2007).
3 Id. at 71.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 79.
6 In re Estrada, 143 P.3d 731, 735-36 (N.M. zoo6).
7 See id. at 737-39.
8 See id. at 741.
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case.9 In an unsparingly critical opinion, the New Mexico Supreme Court
suspended Estrada from practice for one year but deferred her suspension
for a probationary period in recognition of mitigating circumstances. l0
The idea that co-counsel may find themselves actually or potentially
adverse to one another is unremarkable, as is the notion that co-counsel
relationships may have significant professional responsibility components.
Co-counsel relationships between attorneys in different law firms are quite
common. Corporations often engage national or coordinating counsel to
work with local or regional counsel in various types of litigation. Lawyers
asked by clients to handle cases in foreign jurisdictions affiliate with local
counsel and those relationships often become reciprocal. Two law firms may
"partner" to land business from a corporate client that neither firm could
attract alone. Lawyers who lack experience or expertise in some aspect of
the law may align with specialized co-counsel or veteran practitioners to
achieve competence while preserving client relationships. Lawyers may
refer clients to attorneys with specialized practices while maintaining a
broader concurrent relationship with those clients and ostensibly overseeing
the work of the lawyers to whom the referrals are made. Transactional
lawyers may work with counterparts at other firms on different aspects of
a joint client's acquisition, merger, multi-state secured loan, or real estate
transaction. Indeed, co-counsel and referral relationships between lawyers
in different firms are so common and widespread that controversies are
inevitable, whether linked to tactical disagreements, errors or misjudgments
by one of the participants, client-centered disputes, or fights over fees.
At the same time, professional liability and responsibility aspects of co-
counsel and referral relationships have largely escaped scholarly attention.
Related articles are rare." The leading legal malpractice treatise devotes
approximately five pages to rights among counsel and even less space to
referrals and local counsel relationships l" and a recent legal malpractice
casebook excerpts only one case on lawyers' duties to co-counsel while
citing to three others. 3 This Article recognizes that courts and lawyers
presented with co-counsel questions and controversies require more
substantive guidance than has so far been available.
Looking ahead, Part I of the Article addresses co-counsel's potential
9 See id.
io Id. at 744.
I I See, e.g., Glen Lea, How to Keep Your Co-Counsel From Becoming Your Co-Defendant: Tips
for Managing Risk in Co-Counsel Relationships, W. VA. LAw., June 2oo4, at 22; Barry R. Temkin,
Can Negligent Referral to Another Attorney Constitute Legal Malpractice?, 17 ToURo L. REV. 639,
640-42 (2001).
12 I RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 5:9, at 685-94 (2009
ed.).
13 SUskN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW: PROBLEMS AND
PREVENTION 170-74 (zoo8).
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liability to one another for breach of fiduciary duty or legal malpractice. It
then examines lawyers' ability to obtain contribution, indemnity or setoffs
from co-counsel when accused of professional negligence by a common
client. As we will see, courts staunchly resist recognizing lawyer-to-lawyer
liability for breach of fiduciary duty or malpractice and are only somewhat
more receptive to third-party practice where potential liability to a client is
involved.
Part II examines three areas or scenarios in which co-counsel may face
liability to clients. It first analyzes lawyers' liability arising out of the referral
of matters to lawyers outside their firms who then breach duties to clients.
Second, it discusses lawyers' joint or vicarious liability for co-counsel's
errors. Third, it looks at issues commonly encountered in co-counsel
relationships characterized by one lawyer's service as "local counsel."
Finally, Part III surveys three professional responsibility subjects
relevant to co-counsel: (a) the duty to inform a client of another lawyer's
malpractice or fiduciary breach; (b) lawyers' supervisory duties under
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1; and (c) the appropriate division of
legal fees between lawyers in different firms, generally referred to as "fee-
splitting."
I. LAWYER LIABILITY TO Co-COUNSEL AND THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE
To analyze lawyers' potential liability to co-counsel, it is necessary to
understand lawyer liability arising out of clients' representations more
broadly. Most lawyer liability cases are premised on two theories: legal
malpractice or professional negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty.14
Although variously phrased by courts, a plaintiff alleging legal malpractice
must prove that (1) her lawyer owed her a duty, (2) the lawyer breached
that duty, and (3) the lawyer's breach of duty proximately caused (4)
actual damages."5 The lawyer's duty of care flows from the attorney-client
relationship.16 It is accordingly the general rule that, in the absence of fraud
14 In addition, lawyers are often sued by third parties for aiding and abetting clients'
misconduct. Aiding and abetting liability, while a serious threat to lawyers, is beyond the
scope of this Article. For recent discussions of the subject, see Katerina P. Lewinbuk, Let's
Sue All the Lawyers: The Rise of Claims Against Lawyers for Aiding and Abetting a Client's Breach
of Fiduciary Duty, 40 ARiz. ST. L.J. 135 (2008); Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyer Liability for
Aiding and Abetting Clients' Misconduct Under State Law, 75 DEF. COUNS. J. 130 (2oo8); Eugene
J. Schiltz, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting: Should Lawyers Be "Privileged" to Assist Their
Clients' Wrongdoing?, 29 PACE L. REV. 75 (2008).
15 See Paterek v. Petersen & Ibold, 890 N.E.2d 3 16, 319-20 (Ohio zoo8) (quoting Vahila v.
Hall, 674 N.E.2d 1164, 1165-66 (Ohio 1997));Jeanes v. Bank of Am., N.A., 191 P.3d 325,331-32
(Kan. Ct. App. 2oo8); Rydde v. Morris, 675 S.E.zd 431,433 (S.C. 2oo9); Belt v. Oppenheimer,
Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Peeler v. Hughes &
Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494,496 (Tex. 1995)); Williams v. Joynes, 677 S.E.2d 261, 264 (Va. 20o9).
16 See Cleveland Campers, Inc. v. R. Thad MeCormack, P.C., 635 S.E.zd 274, 276 (Ga. Ct.
2009-201o]
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or other improper motives, lawyers are liable for professional negligence
exclusively to those with whom they have an attorney-client relationship. 7
This is sometimes referred to as the "strict privity rule."' 8  Lawyers'
liability for breach of fiduciary duty arising from their representation
similarly requires proof of (1) an attorney-client relationship giving rise to a
fiduciary duty, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) actual damages proximately
caused by the breach.' 9 Because the lawyer's fiduciary duty flows from the
attorney-client relationship, lawyers are generally liable on this theory only
to clients.
20
Courts are reluctant to expand lawyers' potential liability for malpractice
or breach of fiduciary duty to non-clients because doing so "could result in
potential ethical conflicts for the attorney and compromise the attorney-
client relationship, with its attendant duties of confidentiality, loyalty, and
care."" Nonetheless, lawyers may owe duties to non-clients in limited
circumstances, such as when a client hires a lawyer specifically to benefit
a third party,22 or when the non-client is otherwise the direct and intended
beneficiary of the lawyer's services.2 3 Incidental beneficiary status, on the
other hand, will not support liability.2 4 Determining whether a non-client
is a direct and intended beneficiary of a lawyer's services is necessarily a
fact-dependent inquiry.25 Generally speaking, courts are most willing to
recognize duties to non-clients in trusts and estates matters. 26
App. 2oo6) (quoting Richard v. David, 442 S.E.zd 459,460 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994)).
17 McIntosh County Bank v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 745 N.W.2d 538,545 (Minn. 20o8);
AG Capital Funding Partners v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 842 N.E.2d 471, 478 (N.Y zoo5)
(quoting Estate of Spivey v. Pulley, 526 N.Y.S.zd 145, 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)).
18 Blair v. Ing, z P3d 452,458-59 (Haw. 2001); Shoemaker v. Gindlesberger, 887 N.E.2d
1167, 1171 (Ohio zoo8); Friske v. Hogan, 698 N.W.zd 526, 529 (S.D. 2005).
19 Slovensky v. Friedman, 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 60, 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2oo6) (quoting Stanley
v. Richmond, 41 Cal. Rptr. zd 768, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)); Christensen & Jensen, P.C. v.
Barrett & Daines, 194 P.3d 931, 938 (Utah 2oo8) (quoting Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding,
909 P.zd 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)).
zo See, e.g., Shivvers v. Hertz Farm Mgmt., Inc., 595 N.W.zd 476,479-80 (Iowa 1999) (af-
firming summary judgment for lawyer on breach of fiduciary duty claim by non-client).
21 McIntosh County Bank, 745 N.W.zd at 545.
22 DeLuna v. Burciaga, 857 N.E.2d 229, 247 (I11. 2006).
23 Estate of Leonard ex rel. Palmer v. Swift, 656 N.W.2d 132, 145-46 (Iowa 2003); Credit
Union Cent. Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262, 1272-73 (R.I. 2009).
24 Zenith Ins. Co. v. Cozen O'Connor, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 9 11, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007);
Strait v. Kennedy, 13 P.3d 671,674 (Wash. Ct. App. zooo); Connely v. McColloch (In re Estate
of Drwenski), 83 P.3d 457,462 (Wyo. 2004).
25 Estate of Albanese v. Lolio, 923 A.zd 325,332 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007) (quoting
Estate of Fitzgerald v. Linnus, 765 A.2d 251, 26o (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)).
26 See, e.g., Young v. Williams, 645 S.E.zd 624, 625-26 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (allowing tes-
tator's widow to sue testator's lawyer for malpractice); Friske v. Hogan, 698 N.W.2d 526, 531
(S.D. 2005) (concluding that non-client beneficiaries could sue the lawyer who drafted tes-
tamentary instrument for malpractice); Calvert v. Scharf, 619 S.E.zd 197, 207 (W. Va. 2005)
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A. Co-Counsel's Direct Liability to One Another
Given courts' reluctance to permit non-clients to sue lawyers, it should
be no surprise that they generally prohibit suits between co-counsel
alleging legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty. 7 After all, while co-
counsel represent a common client, they do not share an attorney-client
relationship with each other. Other courts, when asked to decide whether
to permit contribution or indemnity actions between co-counsel, have
rejected them and thus could be expected to reject direct claims between
co-counsel as well.
28
There are at least two common policy reasons for courts' refusal to
recognize legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty actions between
co-counsel. First, allowing co-counsel to sue each other would imperil
client confidences. A lawyer sued for malpractice or breach of fiduciary
duty would be permitted to reveal the client's confidences in defending
against co-counsel's allegations. 9 While it is true that a lawyer's duty of
confidenriality and the attorney-client privilege are impliedly waived in
a legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty case brought by the client,
in a suit between co-counsel there is no implied waiver and the client's
confidences may be exposed against its will.3" The thought of lawyers
asking clients to waive confidentiality or the attorney-client privilege so
that they may pursue claims against co-counsel is equally unappealing to
(recognizing that will beneficiaries have standing to sue the drafting lawyer).
27 See, e.g., Beck v. Wecht, 48 P.3d 417,423 (Cal. 2002) (imposing a bright-line rule against
breach of fiduciary duty claims between co-counsel); Olds v. Donnelly, 696 A.2d 633,643 (N.J.
1997) (refusing to recognize a professional negligence claim); Scheffler v.Adams & Reese, LLP,
950 So. zd 641,652-53 (La. 2007) (rejecting a breach of fiduciary duty claim under a bright-line
rule); Charles Gruenspan Co. v. Thompson, No. 80748, 2003 WL 21545134, at *7 (Ohio Ct.
App. July 10, 2003) (refusing to recognize legal malpractice claim); Hughes v. Housley, 599
P.2d 1250, 1254 (Utah 1979) (rejecting legal malpractice claim); Mazon v. Krafchick, 144 P.3d
1168, 1172-73 (Wash. 2006) (adopting a bright-line rule against both breach of fiduciary duty
and legal malpractice theories); Horn v. Wooster, 165 P.3d 69, 78-79 (Wyo. 2007) (rejecting
legal malpractice claim).
28 See, e.g., Shealy v. Lunsford, 355 F Supp. 2d 820, 828-30 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (predicting
North Carolina law); Dowd v. Walsh, No. CIV. A. 98-5743, 1999 WL 619338, at 2-3 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. i6, 1999) (applying Pennsylvania law); Stone v. Satriana, 41 P.3d 705, 707 (Colo. 2002)
(concerning nonparty-at-fault designation); Gauthier v. Kearns, 780 A.2d io16, 1021-23 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 2001) (forbidding successor counsel from being added as party to malpractice ac-
tion); Waldman v. Levine, 544 A.zd 683,692-93 (D.C. 1988) (upholding dismissal of third-par-
ty complaint against successor counsel in malpractice action); Melrose Floor Co. v. Lechner,
435 N.W.2d 90, 91-92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (upholding summary judgment on contribution
and indemnity claim).
29 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. i.6(b)(5) (2009) (permitting a lawyer to reveal
information relating to a client's representation to the extent necessary "to respond to allega-
tions in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client").
30 Stone, 41 P3d at 710-I1.
2009-2O0]
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courts.3
Second, allowing co-counsel to sue one another would spawn numerous
conflicts of interest.32 Recognizing duties running between co-counsel
would dilute the lawyers' duty of undivided loyalty to their common client.
3
Rather than considering only the client's best interests, co-counsel would
have to consider their obligations to one another when making decisions
related to the client's representation.34 Co-counsel would thus be forced to
serve multiple masters in any given case.3
Mazon v. Krafchick is an illustrative case.3 6 In Mazon, Tahar Layouni
was seriously injured in an electrocution accident when a drilling company
struck a buried electric line.37 Layouni retained Michael Mazon to represent
him in an action to recover for his injuries.38  With Layouni's consent,
Mazon involved Steven Krafchick, a lawyer with expertise in this type of
case.39 Mazon and Krafchick entered into "a 'joint venture agreement,'
whereby "Mazon would draft the complaint and find the addresses and
agents of the defendants to serve, and Krafchick would file and serve the
complaint." 40 They agreed to split fees and costs equally.41 Unfortunately,
Krafchick's legal assistant did not serve the complaint until three days
after the statute of limitations had run .4  Krafchick told Mazon of the error
approximately one month later and acknowledged his responsibility for
serving the complaint.
4 3
Layouni sued both Krafchick and Mazon for legal malpractice. Both
lawyers had the same professional liability carrier, which settled Layouni's
malpractice suit for $1.3 million, allocating $1.25 million of the settlement
to Krafchick and $50,000 to Mazon.4 Mazon then sued Krafchick for
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, professional negligence, and
indemnification. 4  He sought damages for the loss of the $325,000 fee
31 See Gauthier 780 A.2d at 1023.
32 See Beck, 48 P.3d at422 (quoting Am. Equity Ins. Co. v. Beck, io8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 728, 734
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001), aff'dsub nom. Beck v. Wecht, 48 P.3d 417 (Cal. 2002)).
33 Scheffler v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 950 So. 2d 641, 652 (La. 2007).
34 See Horn v. Wooster, 165 P.3d 69, 78-79 (Wyo. 2007) (recognizing that lawyers' self-
interests could compromise clients' best interests).
35 Mirch v. Frank, 295 F. Supp. 2d i i8o, 1184 (D. Nev. 2003) (quoting Hughes v. Housley,
599 P.zd 1250, 1254 (Utah 1979)).
36 Mazon v. Krafchick, 144 P3d 1168 (Wash. 2006).
37 Id. at 1170.
38 Id.
39 Id.
4o Id.
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 See id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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he had expected to earn from Layouni's case, $465 in costs he advanced,
his $2500 insurance deductible, and his insurer's $50,000 settlement
payment. 46 Mazon's lost contingent fee obviously was the centerpiece of
his suit against Krafchick.
The trial court granted Krafchick summary judgment on Mazon's
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims, reasoning that "allowing
claims for reduced or lost fees would be potentially inconsistent with [co-
counsel's] overriding duties to their client. '47 The trial court did, however,
award Mazon his "out of pocket expenses" and insurance deductible.4 Both
parties then appealed.49 The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's denial of Mazon's recovery for his expected contingent fee and
adopted a bright-line rule "prohibiting [co-counsel] from suing each other
for lost or reduced prospective attorney fees."50 In doing so, the court of
appeals reasoned that while Mazon's claim did not impair his or Krafchick's
duties of undivided loyalty to Layouni, public policy dictated a blanket
prohibition of suits between co-counsel to recover lost prospective fees
because of the potential conflicts of interest such suits would generate."1
The court of appeals determined that a bright-line rule was preferable to
a case-specific approach "because it prevents conflicts from arising at any
point during the representation, assures the client's interest is paramount
regardless of the issue, and is easy to administer.""2 The court of appeals
also allowed Mazon to recover his insurer's $50,000 settlement payment.53
Both parties then sought review by the Washington Supreme Court.-4
The supreme court in Mazon agreed with the lower appellate court's
reasoning and adopted "a bright-line rule that no duties exist between [co-
counsel] that would allow recovery for lost or reduced prospective fees."5 5
As the court explained:
As [co-counsel], both attorneys owe an undivided duty of loyalty to the
client. The decisions about how to pursue a case must be based on the
client's best interests, not the attorneys'. The undivided duty of loyalty
means that each attorney owes a duty to pursue the case in the client's
best interests, even if that means not completing the case and forgoing a
potential contingency fee.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1171.
48 Id.
49 Id
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. at I171-72.
53 Id. at 1171.
54 Id
55 Id. at 1172.
2009-2010 ]
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If we were to recognize an attorney's right to recover from [co-counsel]
... , potential conflicts of interest that harm the client's interests may arise.
[Co-counsel] may develop an impermissible self-interest in preserving
the claim for the prospective fee, even when the client's interests demand
otherwise. Additionally, the question of whether an attorney's claim conflicts
with the client's best interests may be difficult to answer. Discretionary,
tactical decisions, such as whether to advise clients to settle or risk proceeding
to trial and determining the amount and structure of settlements, could be
characterized by [co-counsel] as a breach of the contractual duties or general
duties of care owed to one another and provide a basis for claims seeking
recovery of prospective fees.'
Mazon countered that prohibiting suits between co-counsel would
undermine public confidence in the legal system because under that regime
co-counsel could not be held accountable to one another.57 According to
Mazon, the court's bright-line rule would encourage co-counsel to collude
to conceal malpractice from clients because innocent lawyers exposed to
substantial liability to clients could never be made whole through suits
against negligent co-counsel. ss Faced with the loss of prospective fees and
potential liability to clients, lawyers with no means of recovering from co-
counsel would be more likely to elevate their interests above their clients'. 59
The supreme court was not persuaded.
[W]e find this argument unpersuasive because it presumes that allowing
[co-counsel] to recover prospective fees will eliminate attorneys' incentive
to collude and protect themselves from liability. Instead, we believe that
allowing [co-counsel] to recover prospective fees would create the opposite
incentives to overemphasize the informal divisions of responsibilities
between [co-counsel], overlook any failings of [co-counsel], and later
claim that [co-counsel's] failures were not their responsibility. Prohibiting
[co-counsel] from suing each other for prospective fees arising from an
attorney's malpractice in representing their mutual client provides a clear
message to attorneys: each [co-counsel] is entirely responsible for diligently
representing the client.'
The supreme court reasoned that prohibiting suits between co-counsel
encourages lawyers in such relationships "to back each other up" and
cooperate to reduce the chance of errors or misjudgments in pursuing the
56 Id. at H 172-73.
57 Id. at 1173.
58 Id.
59 Id.
6o Id.
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best result for the client.61 "[Co-counsel] are in the best position to ensure
that they are not injured by each other's mistakes," and encouraging them
to do so is consistent with their duty of "undivided loyalty to the client.
'6
This approach also serves the public interest. 63 Accordingly, the court in
Mazon affirmed the court of appeals' holding and adopted a bright-line
rule against recognizing a duty that would permit co-counsel to recover
prospective fees from one another.64
Scheffler v. Adams and Reese, LLP, is another exemplary case.65 The
plaintiff, Louisiana lawyer William Scheffier, was retained by Boomtown
Casino to defend it in personal injury litigation.66 Before formally engaging
him, Boomtown told Scheffler that his retention had to be approved by
James Perdigao, the casino's regular corporate counsel and a partner with
Adams and Reese, LLP.67 Scheffler met with Perdigao and Boomtown
executives, and was formally retained shortly thereafter.' Scheffler
received a fixed monthly fee from Boomtown and was reimbursed for all of
his litigation-related costs.69 Boomtown instructed him "to work with and
report to Perdigao."7 I Things went smoothly for approximately two years,
but then, on the heels of a vague report by Boomtown officials that Perdigao
was having "ethical problems," a New Orleans newspaper published a story
revealing Perdigao's long-running scheme to defraud Adams and Reese by
collecting fees intended for the firm.7 Although Scheffler worked closely
with Perdigao in representing Boomtown, he knew nothing of Perdigao's
fraud.7" Even so, Boomtown terminated Scheffler's representation in light
of Perdigao's public fall from grace.
3
Scheffler sued Perdigao and Adams and Reese in connection with
Boomtown's termination of his representation. The defendants moved to
dismiss the action, and the case swiftly reached the Louisiana Supreme
Court on the narrow issue of whether Scheffler could maintain a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty against the defendants.74
The court began its analysis by scrutinizing the pleadings for evidence
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 Scheffler v. Adams & Reese, LLP, 950 So. 2d 641 (La. 2007).
66 Id. at 645.
67 Id.
68 See id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 645-46.
2009-201o]
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of a fiduciary relationship between Scheffler and the defendants." Scheffler
had pleaded no facts that would support the existence of such a relationship.7 6
Scheffler and Perdigao were separately retained by Boomtown to represent
the casino in its legal affairs.77 Scheffler had no contract with Perdigao or
Adams and Reese, there was no claim of an agency relationship between
Scheffler and Perdigao or his firm, and Scheffler and Perdigao were not
partners or joint venturers in representing Boomtown.78 Rather, Scheffler
and Perdigao were simply co-agents of Boomtown.7 9 Long story short, there
was no relationship between Scheffler and Perdigao that would support a
fiduciary duty running to the former.'
Scheffler argued that if he were allowed to conduct discovery, he
could "uncover additional facts, not previously pleaded, establishing the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between Perdigao or Adams and Reese
and himself."81 But here Scheffler ran up against public policy, which, the
court reasoned, "dictate[d] against recognizing a fiduciary duty among co-
counsel to protect one another's interest in a prospective fee" betweien co-
counsel."
In discussing the public policy implications of Scheffler's claims, the
court observed that a lawyer's paramount duty is to his client; indeed, "in
no other agency relationship is a greater duty of trust imposed than in
that involving an attorney's duty to his client."8 3 It thus followed that a
lawyer's fiduciary duty to a client "should not be diluted by a fiduciary duty
owed to some other person, such as co-counsel." Although a client's and
lawyer's interests are normally aligned in the pursuit of a favorable result,
"[ilt would be inconsistent with an attorney's duty to exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of [a] client to impose upon him a fiduciary
obligation to take into account the interests of co-counsel in recovering any
prospective fee."8"
The court acknowledged that there was no evidence of a conflict of
interest between Scheffler and Perdigao, but reasoned that a bright-line rule
was "appropriate to avoid even the potential specter of divided loyalty."86
In addition to avoiding conflicts of interest, a bright-line rule against
75 Id. at 647.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 648.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 648-49.
8o Id. at 649.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 651.
84 Id. at 652.
85 Id. at 652-53.
86 Id. at 653.
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fiduciary duty claims between co-counsel "protects the confidentiality of
attorney-client communications."" The court therefore held as a matter of
public policy that "no cause of action will exist between co-counsel based
on the theory that co-counsel have a fiduciary duty to protect one another's
prospective interests in a fee.""
It is easy to understand why courts reject fiduciary duty claims between
co-counsel; many such relationships are not structured in ways in which
one lawyer might be a fiduciary to another. In many instances, co-counsel
are simply fellow agents of a mutual client, as was the case in Scheffler.s9 It is
also obvious that legal malpractice claims between co-counsel ought to fail
in jurisdictions that adhere to the strict privity rule, because co-counsel do
not share an attorney-client relationship with each other. Even in states that
have relaxed the strict privity rule and permit legal malpractice actions by
non-clients who are direct and intended beneficiaries of lawyers' services,
co-counsel are not such beneficiaries of their counterparts' services. At most,
they are incidental beneficiaries, and that status will not support liability.9°
Even if a co-counsel relationship were structured on a fiduciary basis or if
co-counsel could be somehow defined as direct and intended beneficiaries
of each other's services, most claims between them would still be futile for
the mundane reason that any alleged damages are too speculative to be
recoverable. Cases accepted on a contingent fee basis are often lost or are
resolved for a fraction of the amount originally anticipated, such that the
lawyers receive nothing for their services or pocket a far smaller fee than
expected. By way of further example, Boomtown could have terminated
Scheffler's representation at any time, thus bringing his monthly fixed fees
to a halt.
On the other hand, there are arguments for recognizing duties between
co-counsel. For example, the Scheffler court noted that co-counsel might
structure their relationship as a joint venture. 9' At its core, a joint venture
is "an undertaking by two or more persons to carry out a single business
enterprise jointly for profit."9  Joint ventures share certain elements,
but there is no formula for identifying a joint venture relationship in all
instances, as each case turns on its own facts.93 Courts understandably
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 648-49.
90 See Zenith Ins. Co. v. Cozen O'Connor, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 9 11, 918 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007);
Strait v. Kennedy, 13 P.3d 671, 674 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000); Connely v. McColloch (In re Estate
of Drwenski), 83 P.3d 457,462 (Wyo. 2004).
91 Scheffle; 950 So. 2d at 648 n.2.
92 Pellegrini v. Weiss, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387, 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Nelson v.
Abraham, 177 P.2d 931, 933 (Cal. 1947)); see also Lauth Ind. Resort & Casino, LLC v. Lost
River Dev., LLC, 889 N.E.2d 915, 920 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Byrd v. E.B.B. Farms, 796
N.E.zd 747, 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).
93 Sandvick v. LaCrosse, 747 N.W.zd 519, 522 (N.D. 2008).
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characterize some co-counsel relationships as joint ventures.94 Likewise,
co-counsel often consider themselves joint venturers. 9 Regardless, joint
ventures are fiduciary relationships akin to partnerships, 96 and lawyers who
are joint venturers owe one another fiduciary duties that are actionable in
breach.97 Furthermore, under the approach articulated in the Restatement
(Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, lawyers may owe duties to non-
clients where: "(a) the lawyer ... invites the [non-client] to rely on the
lawyer's opinion or provision of other legal services, and the [non-client] so
relies; and (b) the [non-client] is not, under applicable tort law, too remote
from the lawyer to be entitled to protection." ' The Restatement test
describes many co-counsel relationships." As for the notion that damages
in cases between co-counsel will generally be too speculative to support a
recovery, that will not always be true. Thus, lawyers might argue that courts
should recognize causes of action between co-counsel when the requisite
elements are properly pleaded. If a plaintiff's case fails for the inability to
prove all the elements, so be it.
Finally, exempting lawyers from malpractice liability to co-counsel
makes little sense. As a dissenting justice asserted in Mazon:
The majority fears attorneys might "develop an impermissible self-
interest in preserving the claim for the prospective fee, even when the client's
interests demand otherwise." This is fiction. Krafchick's negligence would
never be in the client's interest.... When an attorney commits malpractice
and that same misconduct damages [co-counsel], there is no reason both the
client and [co-counsel] should not be allowed to recover. This result does
not jeopardize an attorney's duty of loyalty, it promotes it."°
Of course, the fact that there was no conflict in Mazon does not mean
that other co-counsel controversies will be conflict-free. Similarly, there
were no confidentiality issues in Mazon, but there may be in different cases.
The bottom line is that bright-line rules are simple but imperfect. That
imperfection may well cause future courts to eschew the bright-line rule of
Mazon and Scheffler in favor of a case-by-case approach. Many states have
yet to address causes of action between co-counsel. It is difficult, however,
94 See, e.g., Duggins v. Guardianship of Washington, 632 So. 2d 420, 426-28 (Miss. 1993)
(finding a joint venture between plaintiffs' lawyers based on shared responsibility for repre-
sentation and division of contingent fee); Fitzgibbon v. Henry A. Carey, P.C., 688 P.zd 1367,
1371 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming trial court finding that class counsel were joint venturers).
95 See, e.g., Mazon v. Krafchick, 144 P.3d i168, 1170 (Wash. zoo6).
96 Pellegrini, 8i Cal. Rptr. 3d at 397; Scheffler, 950 So. 2d at 648 n.2.
97 See Romanek v. Connelly, 753 N.E.2d io62, 1072 (II1. App. Ct. 2oo).
98 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 1(2) (2000).
99 SeeMazon, 144 P3d at 1175-76 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
IOO Id. at 1176 (Sanders, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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to see how recognizing legal malpractice actions between co-counsel will
erode public confidence in the legal profession, a reason regularly offered
for refusing co-counsel the right to recover prospective fees when joint
representations are ruined by error.' Attorney fee disputes are a regular
feature of the litigation landscape and are the subject of numerous reported
opinions. The same is true for conflicts of interest. To the extent courts
wish to prohibit actions between co-counsel, they should do so for reasons
other than the speculative preservation of public confidence in the legal
profession or system.
Lawyers' general inability to sue co-counsel for malpractice or breaches
of fiduciary duties does not mean that they are precluded from suing them
for all possible wrongs.' For example, lawyers may be able to sue co-
counsel for breach of contract, as where a lawyer allegedly reneges on an
agreement to divide fees.0 3 It is also conceivable that in some circumstances
a lawyer might be able to sue co-counsel for negligent or fraudulent
misrepresentation, given that courts have permitted third-parties to sue
lawyers on these theories. °4 As a California court observed in holding
that a law firm could be held liable for fraud to a transactional counter-
party, "[A] fraud claim against a lawyer is no different from a fraud claim
against anyone else."'05 Other courts have reached similar conclusions. 1°6
At least one court has permitted a law firm to sue opposing counsel for
indemnity based on the opposing lawyer's fraudulent misrepresentations in
ioI See, e.g., Beck v. Wecht, 48 P3d 417, 421 (Cal. zooz) (quoting Mason v. Levy & Van
Bourg, 143 Cal. Rptr. 389,392 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)); Mazon, I44 P3d at 1173 (quoting Beck, 48
P3d at 421); Horn v. Wooster, 165 P.3d 69, 79 (Wyo. 2007).
102 A lawyer might be able to sue co-counsel for breach of fiduciary duty if that duty was
not premised on an attorney-client relationship or did not essentially duplicate a legal mal-
practice claim. See, e.g., Thomas B. Olson & Assocs. v. Leffert, Jay & Polglaze, P.A., 756 N.W.2d
907, 914-17 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008) (permitting breach of fiduciary duty action by predecessor
counsel versus successor counsel based on an alleged conversion of funds held in trust in suc-
cessor counsel's trust account).
103 See, e.g., Parker & Waichman v. Napoli, 815 N.Y.S.2d 71, 74 (N.Y. App. Div. zoo6) (re-
fusing to dismiss co-counsel's action for breach of contract arising out of a fee dispute); Marks
v. Swartz, 882 N.E.2d 924, 928-35 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (affirming judgment for co-counsel in
breach of contract action seeking share of fees); Hoglund v. Meeks, 170 P3d 37,48 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2007) (permitting lawyer to sue co-counsel for "actual fees based on contract for work he
performed in the past").
IO4 See, e.g., Orshoski v. Krieger, No. OT-oI-OO9, 2001 WL 1388037, at *4-6 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 9, zoo i) (allowing non-clients to sue lawyer for negligent misrepresentation); McCamish,
Martin, Brown & Loeffier v. EE. Appling Interests, 991 S.W.2d 787, 791-95 (Tex. 1999) (per-
mitting non-clients to sue lawyers for negligent misrepresentation).
io5 Vega v. Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 26,31 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
1o6 See, e.g., Smith v. Math, 984 So. 2d 1179, 1188-89 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (allowing party
to sue opposing counsel for fraud); Credit Union Cent. Falls v. Groff, 966 A-2d z6z, 1271
(R.I. 2009) (calling fraud "a well-settled exception to the privity requirement" in suits against
lawyers); Clark v. Druckman, 624 S.E.2d 864,870 (W. Va. 2005) (quoting Vega, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d
at 31-32) (discussing lawyers' litigation privilege).
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a commercial transaction." 7 If courts will permit third parties-including
opposing parties and adverse counsel-to sue lawyers for fraud and
misrepresentation, it is reasonable to assume that they would permit such
actions by co-counsel on the right facts. Still, such actions are rarely likely
to succeed.
In Blondell v. Littlepage, for example, William Blondell was engaged
by Lois and Hugh Corbin to represent them in a medical malpractice
action. s08 He referred the matter to another lawyer, Diane Littlepage, and
Blondell and Littlepage became co-counsel and established a fee-sharing
agreement. 10 9 According to this agreement, Littlepage assumed primary
responsibility for the case with Blondell agreeing to provide services at
Littlepage's request."0 At least partially in response to Littlepage's advice
that Blondell's delay in filing the action afforded the defendants an
arguably valid statute of limitations defense, the Corbins eventually settled
their case for a sum far less than Blondell anticipated."' Blondell sued
Littlepage for "fraud/deceit, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, and intentional interference with contractual relations."" The
trial court granted Littlepage summary judgment and Blondell appealed. 113
Blondell framed the sole issue on appeal as follows:
Was the [trial] court legally correct in granting... summary judgment...
after [Littlepage], without informing or consulting [Blondell], advised the
clients to settle the matter by falsely stating to them that [Blondell] had not
timely filed their claim and had committed malpractice, necessitating an
immediate settlement?"'
The Blondell court agreed with the trial court and therefore affirmed
summary judgment for Littlepage.11s
The court began its analysis by stating that Blondell's fraud and
negligence claims depended on the existence of a duty owed to him by
Littlepage."6 Blondell advanced three duty arguments. First, he reasoned,
his co-counsel relationship and fee-sharing agreement with Littlepage
107 Hansen v. Anderson, Wilmarth & Van Der Maaten, 630 N.W.2d 818, 823-27 (Iowa
2001).
io8 Blondell v. Littlepage, 968 A.zd 678, 68o (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2oo9).
1o9 Id.
i1o Id.
iii Id.
112 Id.
I13 Id. at 68i.
114 Id.
i15 Id.
i16 Id. at 685.
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gave rise to a special relationship supporting a duty."7 Second, he cited the
statement in section 56 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers that "lawyers are 'subject to liability to a client or [non-client]
when a [non-lawyer] would be in similar circumstances.""'" Third, he
invoked section 51 of the Restatement, which addresses lawyers' liability
to third parties. u 9 The court rejected all three arguments.
The court rebuffed Blondell's special relationship argument because
it ran contrary to Maryland's strict privity rule in legal malpractice cases.2 0
By elevating co-counsel status to a special relationship, Blondell effectively
advocated expanding lawyers' liability to non-clients, with a corresponding
detrimental effect on lawyers' duty of loyalty to clients.' The court
found that this impairment of loyalty is "precisely the problem the strict
privity rule seeks to avoid."' 2 As for Blondell's theory based on section 56
of the Restatement, the court dismissively explained that section 56 did
nothing more than state the obvious point that lawyers' status as counsel
"does not provide blanket protection from liability when liability would
otherwise exist."2 3 Accordingly, "refusing to recognize the novel tort duty
between co-counsel" was entirely consistent with the section 56 provision
that "lawyer[s] should share the same tort liability as [non-lawyers] would
under similar circumstances."'21 4 Finally, with respect to section 51 of the
Restatement, the court simply did not believe that it applied to the facts
presented.
2 1
Retreating, Blondell argued for a duty based on ethics rules and on his
fee-sharing agreement with Littlepage; neither approach succeeded.2 6 As
the court explained with respect to the first:
The mere existence of a contract, in this context a fee sharing agreement,
is also not enough to create a tort duty. In fact, the fee sharing agreement
here directly contradicts Blondell's position that Littlepage owed him
a duty of consultation and communication, stating that Blondell would
provide services "as requested" by Littlepage. Though Blondell technically
remained co-counsel, and had some minimal involvement in the case, these
circumstances are not enough to elevate his relationship with Littlepage to
117 See id at 688.
I18 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 56 (zooo)).
119 Id. at 688-89 (quoting RESTATEMENT (TH'IRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51
(zooo)).
120 Id. at 688.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 688-89.
126 Id. at 689.
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special status."7
With respect to the second, the court noted that ethics violations do not
give rise to private rights of action.' If Blondell thought Littlepage was
dishonest, his proper course of action was to report her to disciplinary
authorities.129
Regarding his breach of contract claim, which was premised on the
fee-sharing agreement, Blondell theorized that Littlepage had breached
the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in all contracts. 30 This
argument was also unsuccessful. While Maryland law implies a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in all contracts, Littlepage paid Blondell his
share of their contingent fee from the Corbins' settlement, and thus fulfilled
the terms of their agreement.' 3' Blondell contended that the duty of good
faith and fair dealing obligated Littlepage to communicate and consult
with him concerning the Corbins' representation, but that argument failed
because of a lack of supporting authority.3 Moreover, the fee agreement
authorized Littlepage to prosecute the Corbins' case without consulting
Blondell, as evidenced by the language making her primarily responsible
for the representation and obligating Blondell to perform services only as
she requested.1
33
Blondell's breach of fiduciary duty claim was doomed first by the fact
that Littlepage performed her obligation under the fee-sharing agreement
by paying Blondell the amount he was due when the case settled.' 34
Nothing in the fee-sharing agreement required Littlepage to consult with
Blondell concerning the Corbins' representation. 3 The argument was also
undermined by the fact that, because he and Littlepage did not share equal
responsibility for representing the Corbins, their relationship could not be
characterized as a joint venture. 136 Finally, even if Blondell could establish
the existence of a joint venture, "[lawyers'] fiduciary duties arising from
a fee sharing agreement are ordinarily limited to accounting for fees and
expenses and are unrelated to providing legal advice to the joint client. ' 137
127 Id. (citing Jacques v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 515 A.zd 756, 759 (Md. 1986) ("[A] duty
assumed or implied in contract by fact alone [does not] become a tort duty.")).
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 692.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 693.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 694.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 694-95.
137 Id. at 695.
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There was no "generic cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty."3 '
Blondell's final claim against Littlepage alleged her tortious interference
with his contractual relations. This theory failed for the obvious reason
that Littlepage was a party to the fee-sharing agreement on which it was
premised, and it is commonly accepted that a parry cannot tortiously
interfere with her own contract. 139  Blondell unsuccessfully tried to
escape this principle by arguing that he had an independent obligation to
represent the Corbins as one of their co-counsel and, as to that relationship,
Littlepage was a stranger. 140 Branding this argument a "non-sequitur," the
court correctly noted that while Blondell and Littlepage each owed the
Corbins a duty of undivided loyalty, Littlepage was nonetheless a party to
the fee-sharing agreement.' 4 ' Thus, the rule that a party cannot interfere
with its own contract still defeated Blondell's claim.
4
2
B. Contribution, Indemnity, and Setoff Claims
Co-counsel's general inability to sue one another for breach of fiduciary
duty or legal malpractice does not mean that co-counsel will categorically
escape responsibility to their counterparts when clients sue for malpractice.
A lawyer sued for malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty by a client may
be able to mitigate her damages through a contribution or indemnity claim
against co-counsel, or by seeking a setoff for co-counsel's alleged liability.43
Even courts that have prohibited co-counsel from suing each other for
breach of fiduciary duty or legal malpractice have permitted them to assert
contribution or indemnity claims, 144 provided the requisite conditions or
factors are satisfied.145 Indeed, while courts have uniformly resisted direct
actions between co-counsel, many have allowed co-counsel to maintain
138 Id.
139 Id. at 696.
140 See id. (referring to Littlepage as a "third party").
141 Id. at 696-97.
I42 Id. at 697.
143 See, e.g., Connell, Foley & Geiser, LLP v. Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 872 A.2d
i oo, I io8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (involving concurrent counsel).
144 Compare Beck v. Wecht, 48 P3d 417, 423 (Cal. 2002) (establishing a bright-line rule
against breach of fiduciary duty actions between co-counsel over lost fees), with Musser v.
Provencher, 48 P.3d 408, 414 (Cal. zooz) (permitting contribution and indemnity claims be-
tween co-counsel).
145 But see, e.g., Erickson v. Erickson, 849 F Supp. 453,458-59 (S.D. W. Va. 1994) (reject-
ing contribution and indemnity claims where lawyer asserting them was accused of fraud and
bore fault, and lawyers did not have common obligations); Rivas v. Raymond Schwartzberg
& Assocs., 861 N.Y.S.2d 313,314 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (rejecting contribution and indemnity
claims because second lawyer was not joint tortfeasor); Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of America v.
Schoendorf & Sorgi, 549 N.W.2d 429,433 (Wis. 1996) (rejecting contribution where law firms
were successive rather than joint tortfeasors).
2009-20101
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
contribution or indemnity actions against each other.146 Parler & Wobberv.
Miles &Stockbridge, PC., leads this line of authority.
14
1
In Parler& Wobber, Royal Insurance hired Miles & Stockbridge ("Miles")
to defend Salomon, Inc., its insured, in an asbestos case referred to as the
"Jerome litigation."' 48  Unfortunately, Miles apparently misunderstood
the effect of removing the Jerome litigation to federal court during its
time to answer and, therefore, the court filed a default judgment against
Salomon. 149 Miles also allegedly failed to timely identify possible third-
party defendants. s0 Royal fired Miles and replaced it with another firm,
Parler &Wobber ("Parler"). "I Parler failed to file any third-party complaints
before the deadline for doing so and also conceded the effectiveness of the
default judgment when it allegedly should not have done so."'2 Eventually,
Royal settled the Jerome litigation for $1.6 million supposedly on Parler's
advice.'53 Royal sued Miles in a Maryland federal court for malpractice for
allowing the default and failing to timely identify third-party defendants,
which it claimed compelled the $1.6 million settlement. 14 Miles in turn
filed a third-party complaint against Parler for contribution and indemnity,
contending that Parler blundered in failing to vacate the default judgment,
was negligent in not filing third-party complaints, and erred in advising
Royal to settle the Jerome litigation for more than it was worth.'
The district court hearing the malpractice case certified the following
question to the Maryland Court of Appeals: "[W]hen a client sues former
counsel for professional malpractice, may that former counsel implead the
client's successor counsel for contribution and indemnification where it
alleges that successor counsel's professional negligence in the same matter
contributed to the injury suffered by the client?" 5 6 The court in Parler &
146 Alper v. Altheimer & Gray, 257 E3d 68o, 688-89 (7th Cir. zooo) (recognizing Illinois
law); Musser 48 P.3d at 414; Goran v. Glieberman, 659 N.E.zd 56, 6i (II. App. Ct. 1995); Parler
& Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, P.C., 756 A.zd 526, 547 (Md. 2000); Maddocks v. Ricker,
531 N.E.2d 583, 589-90 (Mass. 1988); JMC Venture Partners v. Lee, No. 055427A, zoo6 WL
30io699, at *3-6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 31, zoo6); Connell, Foley & Geiser, LLP 872 A.2d at
iio8; La Porte v. Mott, 642 N.YS.2d 418,419 (N.Y App. Div. 1996); Hansen v. Brognano, 524
N.Y.S.zd 862, 863 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Scott v. Francis, 838 P.zd 596, 599 (Or. 1992); Sheetz,
Inc. v. Bowles Rice McDavid Graff & Love, PLLC, 547 S.E.zd 256, 269 (W. Va. 2001); Brown
v. LaChance, 477 N.W.2d 296,300-02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
147 Parler & Wobber, 756 A.2d 526.
148 Id. at 529.
149 Id. at 529-30.
150 Id. at 530.
151 Id. at 529-30.
152 Id. at 530.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 530-3!.
156 Id. at 531.
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Wobber answered the certified question in the affirmative." 7
Dissecting the parties' positions, Miles asserted that Parler's impleader
was clearly proper under the Maryland Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (UCATA).5 8 Parler argued that despite UCATA's apparent
applicability, public policy considerations precluded its liability given that
the client sued only Miles. 159 Allowing former counsel to implead successor
counsel, Parler argued, "would breach the attorney-client relationship by
invading the successor attorney's duty of confidentiality owed to the client
and the attorney-client privilege."' 6 According to Parler, recognizing a
contribution or indemnity claim here would "create a potential conflict
between the interests of the client and the inherent self-protection instinct
of the successor attorney."1 6' Parler warned that if the court permitted Miles
to implead it under UCATA, the decision would "open Pandora's box by
providing a third party with the right to interfere in the sacred attorney-
client relationship."
62
The court recognized that confidentiality is a core value of the attorney-
client relationship, but it is not absolute. 163 Furthermore, Parler failed to
acknowledge the critical distinction between a lawyers' ethical duty of
confidentiality and the evidentiary basis of the attorney-client privilege.
164
This duty of confidentiality encompasses all situations except those where
the law compels the lawyer to provide evidence. 61 In that situation, only
the attorney-client privilege prevents the lawyer from revealing confidential
information. 166 Thus, relevant evidence must be produced unless it is
protected against discovery by the attorney-client privilege, and lawyers'
ethical duty of confidentiality is subordinate to "the search for truth."'
167
With respect to the attorney-client privilege, the court noted that it is
not absolute either, as clients may expressly or impliedly waive it. 168 Under
Maryland law, the privilege is impliedly waived in any proceeding in
which a client challenges its lawyers' advice or activities.1 69 The question
for the court was "whether [it] should extend the implied waiver rule
157 Id.
158 Id. at 531-32.
159 Id. at 532.
16o Id.
i6i Id.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 535-36.
164 Id. at 536.
j65 Id. (quoting In re Criminal Investigation No. 1/242Q, 6o2 A.2d 1220, 1222 (Md.
1992)).
166 Id. (quoting In re Criminal Investigation No. 11242Q, 6oz A.2d at 1222).
167 Id.
168 Id. at 537.
169 Id.
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... to attorney-client privileged communications between the client and
successor counsel when the client, by claiming malpractice or negligence
against former counsel, has injected an issue that also implicates successor
counsel's negligence in the same matter." 170
The court in Parler & Wobber rejected Miles' argument that a client's suit
against its former counsel automatically waives its attorney-client privilege
with successor counsel.171 Instead, the court adopted the Hearn test for
waiver,17 which is derived from the case of Hearn v. Rhay.1 73 Under this
test, a court should find an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege
where:
(1) [A]ssertion of the privilege was the result of some affirmative act, such as
filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) ... the asserting party put the protected
information at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of
the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to information
vital to his defense.
1 74
On remand to the district court, Miles would bear the burden of showing
an implied waiver using the Hearn test.1 71 If Miles could not do so, it would
obviously face significant evidentiary problems in defending itself. The
existence of that potential hurdle was not, however, a sufficient basis for
rejecting the firm's right to contribution or indemnity.
The court also considered cases from around the country in concluding
that courts permitting contribution and indemnity actions were more
closely aligned with Maryland law than those that did not.176 Although the
Parler & Wobber court shared its sister courts' desire to uphold the attorney-
client privilege and protect the attorney-client relationship, it was reluctant
to exempt joint tortfeasors from responsibility for their negligence.1 7  The
wiser public policy course was "for the parties to lay their cards on the table
for the fact-finder to determine the facts and allocate the loss to the proper
parties, rather than granting successor counsel a shield of immunity for its
alleged wrongful acts."
178
Many courts prohibit third-party actions between co-counsel for the
same reasons they reject direct actions. 7 9 In Stone v. Satriana, for example,
170 Id. at 538.
171 Id. at 545.
172 Id. at 545-46.
173 Hearn v. Rhay, 68 ER.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
174 Parler & Wobber 756 A.2d at 541-42 (quoting Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581).
175 Id. at 546.
176 Id. at 542.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 544.
179 See, e.g., Shealy v. Lunsford, 355 F. Supp. 2d 82o, 828-29 (M.D.N.C. zoo5) (predicting
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the Supreme Court of Colorado refused to permit a law firm to designate
a former client's successor counsel as a nonparty-at-fault. 180 In so holding,
the court was persuaded by the reasoning of courts in other states that
had disallowed contribution or indemnity actions because they (a) might
be misused as a litigation tactic to disqualify successor counsel, (b) could
create conflicts of interest, and (c) might jeopardize client confidences. 8
Additionally, successor counsel have no duty to mitigate harm done by a
legal malpractice plaintiff's predecessor counsel. 182 Without such a duty,
the Stone court reasoned, it would be improper to designate successor
counsel as a nonparty-at-fault 83
At least one court has charted a middle course based on a comment to
section 53 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers,'
14
which states:
When the damage caused by the negligence or fiduciary breach of a
lawyer is increased by the negligence or fiduciary breach of successor
counsel retained by the client, the first lawyer... may not seek contribution
or indemnity from the successor lawyer in the same action in which the
successor lawyer represents the client, for that would allow the first lawyer
to create or exacerbate a conflict of interest for the second lawyer and force
withdrawal of the second lawyer from the action. The first lawyer may,
however, dispute liability in the negligence or fiduciary breach action for
the portion of the damages caused by the second lawyer .... The client
may then choose whether to accept the possibility of such a reduction in
damages or to assert a second claim against successor counsel, with the
resultant necessity of retaining a third lawyer to proceed against the first
two.
185
In Mirch v. Frank, a Nevada federal court reasoned that the Restatement
approach balanced the competing interests for and against recognizing
North Carolina law); Dowd v. Walsh, No. CIV. A. 98-5743, 1999 WL 619338, at *2-3 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 16, 1999) (applying Pennsylvania law); Stone v. Satriana,41 P.3d 705, 710-12 (Colo. 2002)
(concerning a nonparty-at-fault designation); Gauthier v. Kearns, 78o A.zd ioz6, 1021-23
(Conn. Super. Ct. 2001); Waldman v. Levine, 544 A.2d 683,692-93 (D.C. 1988); Melrose Floor
Co. v. Lechner, 435 N.W.2d 90, 91-92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
I8o Stone, 41 P 3 d at 7o8-12 (explaining the nonparty-at-fault designation under
Colorado law).
181 Id. at 709-11.
182 Id. at 711; see also Daniel B. Meyer & Edward C. Eberspacher IV, Legal Malpractice
and the Liability of Successor Counsel, FOR THE DE., May 2009, at 16-i7 (discussing the succes-
sor counsel doctrine in legal malpractice litigation).
183 Stone, 41 P3d at 712.
184 Mitch v. Frank, 295 F. Supp. 2d II8o, I 185-86 (D. Nev. 2003).
185 RESTATEMENT (rIIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. i (2000) (citations
omitted).
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contribution and indemnity actions between successive lawyers. 1' 6 The
court in Mirch observed that the Restatement approach "[places] the course
of the litigation and the ultimate waiver of attorney-client privilege in the
hands of the aggrieved client" where these issues belong.' At the same
time, it affords the former lawyers the affirmative defense they require
without placing successor lawyers in a conflict of interest.'88
The Restatement approach to contribution or indemnity claims between
lawyers raises three points worth mentioning. First, it contemplates
lawyers' successive representations of a client, rather than co-counsel's
concurrent representation.8 9 In a case of two co-counsel committing legal
malpractice during a concurrent representation, allowing a contribution
or indemnity action by one against the other does not pose the conflict
of interest concerns or the potential for abusive litigation tactics that
apparently influenced the Restatement view. Second, this approach ignores
the possibility that a lawyer sued for malpractice or fiduciary breach might
not make a contribution or indemnity claim against successor counsel
in the same action in which the client sues her, but might instead file a
separate action after the initial action is resolved. Again, this tactic avoids
the problems identified in the comment to section 53."9° Finally, to the
extent the conflict of interest concern in the Restatement is premised on
the advocate-witness rule-which holds that lawyers are generally barred
from acting as advocates in trials in which they are likely to be necessary
witnesses' 91-that concern is not uniformly valid. "Successor counsel" may
be a firm with several lawyers, such that one lawyer's likely involvement as
a witness would not necessarily preclude others at the firm from litigating
the matter. 19 Whether that tactic is advisable is a separate question that is
difficult to answer in the abstract.
II. Co-COUNSEL REFERRAL LIABILITY AND JOINT OR VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In many co-counsel representations, each lawyer has an attorney-client
relationship with their mutual client. The lawyers are fellow agents of the
client, each owing the client independent duties of care, confidentiality,
186 Mirrh, 295 E Supp. 2d at II85.
187 Id. at I186 (citing Holland v. Thacher, 245 Cal. Rptr. 247, 251 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)).
I88 Id. at 1185 (citing Goldfisher v. Superior Court, 183 Cal. Rptr. 609, 614-15 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1982)).
189 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 53 cmt. i (2000) (pro-
hibiting the first lawyer from seeking contribution or indemnity from successor counsel "in
the same action in which the successor lawyer represents the client") (citations omitted).
19o See id. (discussing conflict posed for successor counsel when contribution or indem-
nity claims are litigated in same action in which prior counsel is being sued) (citations omit-
ted).
191 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT R. 3.7(a) (2009).
192 Id. at 3.7(b).
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and loyalty. But how is the co-counsel relationship formed? Sometimes
the client retains multiple lawyers for a single matter. Often, it is essentially
what transpired in Mazon v. Krafchick; the client retains one lawyer who, with
the client's consent, associates another lawyer with desired expertise, and
the two lawyers then cooperate to achieve their mutual client's objectives
in the representation. 193 In other matters, the lawyer securing co-counsel
intends that the lawyer she involves will be principally responsible for the
matter-perhaps exclusively so. Some lawyers market their services as
co-counsel to other lawyers. Regardless of how the first lawyer identifies
co-counsel or the nature of their relationship thereafter, the first lawyer
may face liability for negligent referral if the second lawyer breaches duties
to the client."9 Lawyers may also face joint or vicarious liability for co-
counsel's errors. 9 Finally, in co-counsel relationships characterized by one
lawyer's service as "local counsel," questions may surface concerning the
existence and scope of the local counsel's duties to the client and to the
court.
A. Referral Liability
When lawyers arrange for co-counsel to represent a client, they are
serving as their client's agents and accordingly owe their client a duty of
care in the process. 96 This is true regardless of whether the original lawyer
cedes responsibility for the matter after making the referral, or retains
some level of responsibility in cooperation with co-counsel; the lawyer's
duty relates to the referral itself. 97 From a professional responsibility
standpoint, "[a] lawyer should only refer a matter to a lawyer whom the
referring lawyer reasonably believes is competent to handle the matter."'198
In Tormo v. Yormark, Karen Tormo was injured in a New Jersey boating
accident in early July 1968.'99 Tormo's father consulted his regular lawyer,
Edward Devlin, about the accident, but time crept by and Devlin was
unable to settle Tormo's accident claim."° In June 1970 Devlin, who was
licensed to practice only in New York, asked New Jersey lawyer Milton
Yormark to file suit on behalf of Tormo in New Jersey. 0' Devlin had briefly
193 Mazon v. Krafchick, 144 P.3d 1168, 1170 (Wash. zoo6).
194 See Duggins v. Guardianship of Washington, 632 So. zd 420,429 (Miss. 1993).
195 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 12, § 5:9, at 679-81.
196 Id. § 5:9, at 682-83.
197 See Rainey v. Davenport (In re Davenport), 353 B.R. 15o, 18o (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2oo6)
(recognizing a negligent referral as a valid cause of action and explaining that "bringing an
incompetent attorney on board" would violate a lawyer's fiduciary duty to a client).
198 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. 7 (2009).
199 Tormo v. Yormark, 398 R Supp. 1159, 1165 (D.N.J. 1975).
200 Id. at 1165-66.
2oi Id. at i 166.
2009-2010]
484 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 98
met Yormark in late July 1968 when Yormark approached him about the
accident. 02 Yormark claimed to have gotten Devlin's name from Tormo's
father, said that he specialized in personal injury litigation, and expressed
an interest in handling the case. 03 In making the referral, Devlin's only
inquiry into Yormark's qualifications consisted of looking in a legal
directory to confirm his admission to practice in New Jersey.2 04 Devlin did
not discover-as was prominently and repeatedly reported in the Newark
newspaper-that Yormark had been indicted in 1969 for insurance fraud. 05
Yormark was convicted on those charges and sentenced to prison in January
1971, and then disbarred in February 1972.206 Sadly, in the interim, he
settled Tormo's accident claim for $150,000 and stole the settlement
funds.
0 7
Tormo sued the banks involved in the disposition of her settlement
funds in federal court in New Jersey and, in turn, the banks filed a third-
party action against Devlin for negligence in selecting and supervising
Yormark. 08 Devlin moved for summary judgment on the banks' claims.
With respect to the negligent referral allegations, Devlin argued that he
was not liable because he did not have actual knowledge of Yormark's
indictment and, as a New York lawyer, knowledge of the indictment could
not be imputed to him.20 9
The court was persuaded by Devlin's argument. While Devlin, as his
clients' agent, had a duty to exercise care in retaining Yormark to "ensure
that he was competent and trustworthy," he could not be held to have
breached that duty by failing to inquire into Yormark's background beyond
his active bar registration.2 1 ° Yormark's indictment was reported in New
Jersey, but there was no evidence that it was reported more widely and, in
the court's view, Devlin's liability would at least require the latter." The
court explained:
A contrary conclusion would subject out-of-state lawyers to possible
liability for negligence for failure to consult not only a New Jersey lawyer's
personal references and the legal ethics committee in the county in which
he practices, but also the offices of local prosecutors. Yet a reference may be
unaware of an attorney's criminal misadventure, and proceedings before the
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 1167.
205 Id. at i 166-67, 1167 n.9.
2o6 Id. at 1166-67.
207 Id. at 1168.
208 Id. at 1165.
209 Id. at I169.
210 Id. at 117o-71.
211 Id. at 1H70.
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State's committees on ethics are required to be kept confidential. Thus the
burden of these additional inquiries greatly exceeds the risk that a referring
attorney may cause harm to his client by entrusting his affairs to a lawyer
who is known to be licensed by the State.... Devlin relied, in making the
referral, upon the State's judgment that Yormark was fit to practice law. State
regulation of the legal profession is extensive .... Under the circumstances,
he could not be found negligent simply for failing to make further inquiries
into Yormark's background."'
Unfortunately for Devlin, the court's favorable ruling concerning
Yormark's criminal history did not completely answer the question of his
potential liability for negligent referral. According to Devlin's testimony,
when Yormark first approached him, he told Devlin that he had obtained
his name from Tormo's father."1 3 Devlin should have realized that ethics
rules prohibited the solicitation Yormark described. 14 As the court noted,
soliciting clients is a serious ethics breach and lawyers who do this are
"[unworthy] of the trust and confidence essential to the attorney-client
relationship." ' Further, "[an attorney who knowingly entrusted his
client's business to a lawyer who he had reason to believe [had solicited
the client] would be clearly negligent either in making the referral at all,
or in doing so without advising his client of his suspicions."116 As a result,
Devlin's potential liability presented a question of fact for the jury.17
Tormo is an interesting case because of its timing. It was decided in
1975, before the Internet and the widespread use of computerized legal
research services, such as Findlaw, LexisNexis and Westlaw. Today,
a lawyer in Devlin's shoes would be able to locate reports of Yormark's
alleged dishonesty nearly effortlessly. Accordingly, knowledge of Yormark's
misconduct would likely be imputed to Devlin as any reasonable person
doing even cursory research into his co-counsel could have uncovered this
fact.
Lawyers who intend to refer clients to other lawyers should attempt
to learn as much as they reasonably can about those lawyers. This may
be unnecessary if the lawyer being referred (hereinafter referred to as the
"target lawyer") is an established collaborator of the referring lawyer or is
well known to the referring lawyer. Otherwise, reasonable due diligence
would seem to require a referring lawyer to (a) confirm that the target
lawyer is admitted to practice in the jurisdiction; (b) conduct an Internet
search of the target lawyer by name; (c) conduct a LexisNexis or Westlaw
212 Id. at H 70-71 (citations and footnote omitted).
213 Id. at 1171.
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at I 172.
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search of the target lawyer by name in federal and state databases; (d)
review the target lawyer's Martindale-Hubbell listing; and (e) appropriately
question the target lawyer about her qualifications. With respect to the
final step, the target lawyer's ethical duty of honesty entitles the referring
lawyer to rely on her answers absent contrary indications. 18 Beyond these
basic measures, qualifications such as fellowship in the esteemed American
Academy of Appellate Lawyers, American College of Trial Lawyers, or
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel are reasonable indicators
of a lawyer's worthiness for referral, as is membership in other selective
professional associations or societies. If reasonably possible, a lawyer
considering a referral should talk to lawyers who are familiar with the target
lawyer. 19 These lawyers may know things about the lawyer to whom a
referral might be made that are not apparent from other sources, or that
might be masked by the target lawyer's reputation. Overall, these steps
impose a minimal burden on a referring lawyer.
In any event, a lawyer may be held liable for a negligent referral only
if it can be shown that he knew or reasonably should have known that the
lawyer who was referred posed a foreseeable risk of harm to the client in
the representation.2 0 Absent some contrary history, it is not foreseeable
that a lawyer to whom a referral is made will miss routine deadlines or
fail to make scheduled appearances.21 Referring lawyers must be able to
assume some rudimentary competence on the part of lawyers to whom they
send matters, lest they be burdened with a continuing duty of supervision
leading to duplicative work and increased costs to clients. Referring a client
to another lawyer, or even engaging another lawyer on a client's behalf, does
not imply a duty by the referring lawyer to supervise the second lawyer in
that representation.22
On the other side of the coin, a lawyer to whom a matter is referred or
who is added as co-counsel is entitled to place some reliance on the referring
lawyer's investigation or preparatory work.2 3 Similarly, a lawyer to whom
a matter is referred or who affiliates as co-counsel is generally entitled to
rely on the referring lawyer's statements concerning key facts or aspects of
218 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2009) (prohibiting conduct involv-
ing dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
219 Lea, supra note 1 1, at 22.
220 See, e.g., Noris v. Silver, 701 So. 2d 1238, 1241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting a
negligent referral claim).
221 Cf. CVC Capital Corp. v. Weil, Gotshal, Manges, 595 N.Y.S.2d 458, 458 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (finding no duty on the part of New York based counsel to ensure that Puerto
Rican-based counsel timely filed pleadings or made court appearances).
222 Broadway Maint. Corp. v. Tunstead & Schechter, 487 N.Y.S.2d 799,800-01 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1985).
223 Jeansonne v. Bosworth, 6oi So. 2d 739, 741 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (citing Smith v. Our
Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 96o F.2d 439, 446-47 (5th Cir. 1992)).
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the representation."2 4 The reasonableness of the referred lawyer's reliance
understandably depends on the circumstances."' 5 For example, lawyers
who handle Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) cases arguably
must have an independent factual basis for relying on a referring lawyer's
statements or work.22 6 Lawyers may never turn a blind eye to the obvious.
As a general rule, the more deeply the referred lawyer becomes involved
in the representation, the less justifiable or reasonable her reliance on the
referring lawyer becomes. Lawyers who are contemplating the acceptance
of a referral or the affiliation with co-counsel are therefore wise to perform
due diligence on referring attorneys.
B. Joint or Vicarious Liability
Once a lawyer refers a matter to another lawyer or involves a referred
lawyer in a representation as co-counsel, the question then becomes whether
either lawyer can be held jointly or vicariously liable for the other's breach
of duty to the client.2 7 As a rule, a lawyer is not liable for co-counsel's
negligence because the referred lawyer is "an independent agent of the
client over whom the [referring lawyer] has no control."2 8 A lawyer may
be liable for co-counsel's negligence or fiduciary breach, however, if the
lawyers (1) share responsibility for the representation, or (2) agree to divide
a fee.219 The fact that an agreement to divide a fee may be unenforceable
as between the lawyers because it violates ethics rules will not defeat an
aggrieved client's malpractice claim alleging joint or vicarious liability.
30
There are few reported cases on the joint liability of co-counsel,
but, even if there were many, it is unlikely that any would illustrate the
foregoing exceptions to the general rule better than Duggins v. Guardianship
of Washington. " In Duggins, a little boy, Maurice Washington, was blinded
in one eye by the alleged negligence of an ophthalmologist, Dr. John
224 See Scott v. Francis, 838 P.2d 596, 598-99 (Or. 1992) (allowing an indemnity claim by
referred lawyer when referred lawyer alleged that he relied on a referring lawyer's statement
that there were no time pressures when, in fact, the statute of limitations was quickly run-
ning).
225 I MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 12, § 5:9, at 683.
226 See Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 471 F. Supp. 2d 243, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(discussing reasonable reliance in FDCPA referrals).
227 See Pratt v. California, I I F. App'x 833, 836-37 (9th Cir. 2oo) (discussing co-counsel's
joint and several liability for sanctions by the court).
228 RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58 cmt. e (2000).
229 See, e.g., Rieger v. Jacque, 584 N.W.2d 247, 252 (Iowa 1998); Aiello v. Adar, 750
N.Y.S.2d 457,465-66 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2oo2) (predicating joint liability on lawyers' assumption of
joint responsibility for representation as part of an agreement to share fees).
23o Noris v. Silver, 701 So. 2d 1238,1240-41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
231 Duggins v. Guardianship of Washington, 632 So. zd 420 (Miss. 1993).
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Ederington.3 The boy's parents hired W.B. Duggins, a lawyer in Vicksburg,
Mississippi, to sue Ederington for malpractice on their behalf and on behalf
of a guardianship established for their son. 33 Duggins and the parents
entered into a contingent fee agreement for him to represent them and
the guardianship. z34 The agreement gave Duggins the unfettered right to
engage co-counsel at no additional expense to the clients.
35
Duggins recognized his need to associate with an experienced medical
malpractice lawyer and he so informed Washington's parents. 36 He then
sought out Douglas Barfield, a lawyer in Jackson, Mississippi, with medical
malpractice experience. 37 Barfield agreed to become involved in the case
and met with Washington's parents, who were satisfied with his involvement
and qualifications. 38 Duggins and Barfield agreed that Duggins would
compile the necessary medical bills and records and communicate with
the family, and Barfield would prosecute the action and handle settlement
negotiations with Ederington's medical malpractice insurer, St. Paul
Insurance Company.z39 Also, "Duggins and Barfield agreed to divide any
attorneys' fees equally."240
Regrettably, Barfield never filed the intended complaint. 41 To cover
his tracks, he sent Duggins a copy of a fake complaint, complete with a case
number (later determined to be from a case he had filed two years earlier),
a stamp from the court clerk, and a purported filing date. 41 Other than
the fact that the clerk's stamp was not initialed, as was customary in Hinds
County where the suit was purportedly filed, there was nothing about the
fake pleading to alert Duggins to trouble. 43 A few months later, Duggins
was in the Hinds County Courthouse on other business and decided to
check on the case.2" The clerk could not locate the file, but that was not
alarming because Duggins did not have the case number handy, which
limited the clerk's ability to search for it. 45 Still, Duggins was not worried
because Barfield had told him that the case was not set for trial for several
232 Id. at 422.
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id. at 422-23.
238 Id. at 423.
239 Id.
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 Id.
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months.z46
Meanwhile, Barfield was negotiating a settlement with St. Paul, but,
in doing so, he hid Duggins' involvement in the case."4 7 When Duggins
inquired about the negotiations, Barfield told him that he expected to
settle for between $161,000 and $165,000.14' At Barfield's suggestion,
"the two attorneys agreed to cap their attorneys' fees at $48,000 from
the guardianship and $6,000 worth of fees from the insurance company's
[expected] $15,000 settlement with Maurice's parents." 49 Duggins thus
anticipated a fee of $27,000, i.e., one half of the total $54,000 contingent
fee.
2 50
A settlement conference was convened on May 3, 1987, and there
Duggins saw for the first time a settlement agreement stating that the total
settlement was only $95,500.251 He pointed out the discrepancy to Barfield,
who allegedly told him that it was a typographical error."2 Duggins did
not voice his concerns to anyone else at the time because he claimed that
he felt pressure to settle the case. 53 Immediately afterwards, however,
Duggins told Washington's parents that he thought the settlement
agreement was inaccurate, and the next morning he called the judge
presiding over the settlement conference to express the same concern.
54
The judge told him there would be no problem amending the agreement
and instructed Duggins to prepare an order for the judge's signature. 55
Duggins relayed this information to Barfield, who promised to draft the
necessary documents. 56 Unbeknownst to Duggins, the lawyer representing
St. Paul at the settlement conference had given Barfield two settlement
checks, neither of which named Duggins as a payee. 57 In fact, Barfield was
scheming to steal the settlement funds by setting up a trust account for the
guardianship on which he wrote multiple checks for his personal use. 58
A week later, Barfield's dishonesty began to percolate to the surface
when the lawyers and Washington's parents met at a local bank to file some
guardianship papers. Upon leaving the bank, Barfield gave Washington's
father a receipt showing the total attorneys' fees to be $53,589, which
246 Id.
247 Id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 424.
258 Id.
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struck the father as an odd figure, but he said nothing about it. 59 On May
11, Barfield came by Duggins' office to deliver him a check for his fee of
$27,000, and Duggins realized, after looking at the check, that Barfield had
opened a trust account that did not identify him as an account holder." °
When Duggins asked Barfield about the amount of the fee given that the
settlement amount still appeared to be only $95,500, Barfield told him that
he had decided not to take a fee in light of his looming success in another
case. 61 Duggins then deposited the check. 62
In August 1987 Washington's father asked Duggins for a copy of the
contingent fee agreement and told him that Barfield owed the guardianship
money 63 Duggins professed ignorance, but promised to get in touch with
Barfield."6 Before he could do so, he received a memo in the mail from
Barfield, which explained that he was moving to Tennessee but would
be back through Vicksburg later in the month to deposit the remainder
of the money due the guardianship. 65 Now seriously worried, Duggins
retrieved the case number from the fake complaint and checked again
with the Hinds County Circuit Court Clerk, who was then able to find
Barfield's earlier case and informed Duggins that Barfield had never filed
Washington's case. 266 Barfield eventually pleaded guilty to felony theft and
was disbarred for his misappropriation of the guardianship's money.
67
The guardianship sued Duggins, Barfield, and the bank that disbursed
the settlement funds to Barfield. Barfield did not appear at trial and thus
suffered a default judgment for both compensatory and punitive damages.
z62
The trial court found Duggins vicariously liable for Barfield's misconduct,
and therefore subject to punitive damages.1
61
Duggins appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court, asserting that
he could not be vicariously liable for Barfield's actions because Barfield
was an independent contractor.70 The guardianship contended, however,
that Duggins was vicariously liable for Barfield's misconduct as a matter
of joint venture and partnership law.71 In resolving this disagreement,
259 Id.
z6o Id.
z6i Id.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id. at 424-25.
265 Id. at 425.
z66 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 426.
271 Id.
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the Duggins court began by analyzing the "key issue" of control."' The
court noted that it was Duggins who decided to affiliate with Barfield,
and Duggins' contingent fee agreement afforded him the sole discretion
to engage co-counsel. 73 In short, he alone was responsible for Barfield's
participation in the case. Moreover, "[w]hen Duggins associated Barfield,
it was not as an independent contractor, but an equal. '2 74 Duggins and
Barfield divided responsibility for preparing the case and, while there was
no written contract, they agreed to split fees equally."7 ' It was therefore
plain "that each attorney would have an equal stake in the outcome of
the case and there would be joint control of the case."176 If Barfield were
an independent contractor, on the other hand, he likely would have been
compensated by way of a fixed fee rather than a contingent fee. 77
The court reasoned that Duggins' and Barfield's relationship fit the
description of a joint venture. 78 Joint ventures are governed by partnership
law and, under the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA") as adopted by
Mississippi, Barfield's acts could clearly be imputed to Duggins as being
within the joint venture's business. 7 9 Even if that were not the case under
the UPA, Duggins could still be held accountable for Barfield's misconduct
under settled vicarious liability principles.8 0
Duggins countered that he could not be held vicariously liable because
Barfield's criminal conduct was committed outside the scope of their joint
venture, analogizing it to an old case in which one partner shot a burglar
outside the partnership's store.28 1 The court disagreed. Unlike the actors
in the case cited by Duggins, Barfield's misconduct was part and parcel
of the lawyers' joint venture. 82 The court noted that "Itihe handling of
client funds is clearly within the realm of an attorney's representation of a
guardianship." '83 As for Duggins' related contention that he was a victim of
Barfield's dishonesty, the court would have none of it and stated:
[Tihere were sufficient "red flags" which should have caused Duggins
to realize that something was amiss. Duggins' negligence and inaction in
investigating Barfield's suspicious conduct allowed the guardianship to be
272 Id.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 426-27.
278 Id. at 427.
279 Id. at 427-28.
280 Id. at 428.
281 Id. (citing and discussing Idom v. Weeks & Russell, 99 So. 761, 763-64 (Miss. 1924)).
282 Id.
283 Id.
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stripped of all its assets. Contrary to Duggins' claims of being victimized by
Barfield, he is not the true victim. The true victim is the guardianship that
Duggins was sworn to protect.... Rather than spending his time trying to
save his own dollars, Duggins should have given more energy to the efforts
which would have restored all guardianship assets.2 8
The court next addressed Duggins' vicarious liability for punitive
damages. It began by observing that a partnership can have imputed
liability for fraud committed by a partner acting within the scope of his
actual or apparent authority."8 5 "The other partners, though innocent
without knowledge of the act or omission, can be vicariously liable."' 16 Here,
Duggins' vicarious liability for Barfield's misconduct logically extended to
the resulting punitive damages, yet, luckily for Duggins, the trial court had
awarded a paltry $500 in punitive damages against both lawyers. 87
A different scenario played out in Whalen v. DeGraff, Foy, Conway, Holt-
Harris & Mealey.188 There, DeGraff, Foy, Conway, Holt-Harris & Mealey
("DeGraff") had represented Alice Whalen in an attempt to recover her
interest in a partnership, and, in doing so, the firm had obtained a judgment
of nearly $1.236 million against Julius Gerzof.8 9 Before the judgment was
satisfied, Gerzof moved to Florida, where he died.' Four months later,
DeGraff sought assistance from a Florida law firm, Bailey, Hunt, Jones &
Besto ("Bailey"), to preserve Whalen's rights against Gerzof's estate.2 91 In
the beginning, DeGraff asked Bailey only to "determine whether an estate
had been opened [for Gerzof I and advise as to the time in which it would
be necessary to make a claim against the estate." 92 Bailey reported that an
estate had not been opened and that it would take no further action until
instructed to do so.2 93 However, in August 1995, DeGraff informed Whalen
that it had retained Bailey "to follow the Gerzof estate and file any claims
[against it] required with respect to [her] judgment." 94
Meanwhile, DeGraff was negotiating with lawyers for Gerzof's estate
in an effort to settle Whalen's case. 95 DeGraff learned that Gerzof's estate
284 Id. at 429.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id. at 430.
288 Whalen v. DeGraff, Foy, Conway, Holt-Harris & Mealey, 863 N.YS.2d ioo (N.Y. App.
Div. zoo8).
289 Id. at io,.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id.
[ Vol. 98
SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE?
was opened in early 1996 and, in February 1996, instructed Bailey to file a
notice of claim against the estate. z96 Regrettably, Bailey failed to do so in
the time required. 97 When the lawyers for Gerzof's estate realized Bailey's
mistake, they terminated settlement negotiations. z98 Accordingly, Whalen
was unable to satisfy any portion of her judgment from the substantial
assets in Gerzof's estate. She then sued DeGraff, alleging that the firm was
"vicariously liable for the negligence of Bailey and/or negligently failed to
supervise Bailey in filing the notice of claim in Florida." 99
Whalen contended that DeGraff had a non-delegable duty to file
the required notice of claim or, alternatively, that it negligently failed to
supervise Bailey's efforts.300 DeGraff maintained that it fully satisfied any
duty it had with respect to perfecting a claim against Gerzof's estate when it
retained Bailey, and that it was entitled to rely on Bailey to file the notice of
claim. 30' The court sided with Whalen. DeGraff solicited Bailey's assistance
in Whalen's representation without Whalen's prior knowledge, Whalen had
no engagement agreement with Bailey, and Whalen had no contact with
anyone at that firm.312 DeGraff acknowledged that Whalen "completely
relied" on it "to take the necessary steps to satisfy her judgment" out of the
Gerzof estate.3 3 Accordingly, DeGraff assumed responsibility to Whalen
for filing the notice of claim in Florida, and Bailey acted as its subagent.3 4
DeGraff therefore had a duty to supervise Bailey's activities and was
negligent in failing to do so.
305
In summary, lawyers are generally not liable for the fiduciary breaches or
negligence of their co-counsel, since co-counsel are considered independent
agents of the lawyers' mutual client and are not subject to the referring
lawyers' control.3 6 Like all general rules, this one carries exceptions. A
lawyer may be jointly or vicariously liable for co-counsel's misconduct
where he or she (1) shares responsibility for the representation or (2) divides
fees; Duggins nicely exemplifies this line of authority.307 Whalen illustrates
another exception based on agency law principles. There, Bailey was
DeGraff's subagent, and DeGraff (the appointing agent) was thus liable to
296 Id.
297 See id.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 Id. at 102.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 58 cmt. e
(2ooo)).
307 Duggins v. Guardianship of Washington, 632 So. 2d 420,426-3o (Miss. 1993).
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Whalen (the principal) for Bailey's (the subagent) conduct.3 8 It is easy to
see how co-counsel might be classified as subagents in many relationships
and, if they are, the lead or primary lawyers who effectively appoint co-
counsel as subagents will be vicariously liable for co-counsel's mishaps in
the scope of their subagency.
Courts and commentators discussing lawyers' vicarious liability for
the acts of co-counsel have asserted that "[i]f the client's consent is not
obtained for an association, then vicarious liability is the rule .... [I]f the
client consents, then the associated attorney is also personally liable for
malpractice." 3" But that nutshell version of agency law is not altogether
accurate. First, subagents may owe fiduciary duties to their ultimate
principals just as they do to their appointing agents.310 Obviously, the
subagent must know who the ultimate principal is in order to owe a fiduciary
duty to that person or entity.3 ' The point here is simply that client consent
is not the sole determinant in establishing or evaluating a lawyer's liability
in the co-counsel context. In Whalen, for example, the plaintiff might have
sued Bailey in addition to DeGraff, since Bailey clearly knew who she was
before botching the subject filing and thus owed her a duty of care.31 Her
decision not to do so likely had more to do with litigation strategy than it
did with legal standing.
Furthermore, a client might consent to a lawyer engaging co-counsel, but
still hold the original lawyer responsible for the task or matter requiring co-
counsel's involvement pursuant to an agreement.313 In that case, vicarious
liability would remain the rule. Returning again to Whalen as an example,
DeGraff told Whalen of Bailey's co-counsel role several months before the
fatal error.314 Whalen either impliedly consented to Bailey's retention or
ratified it. Still, she wholly relied on DeGraff to take the steps necessary
to satisfy her judgment and the firm knew as much.315 As a result, DeGraff
was vicariously liable for Bailey's error.
Second, while a client may sue the lawyer who engages co-counsel as
a subagent on a vicarious liability theory, that does not mean that the co-
counsel will escape responsibility for her negligence or fiduciary breach.
308 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 3.15 cmt. d (2oo6) (citations omit-
ted).
309 Boskoffv. Yano, 57 F. Supp. zd 994,999 (D. Haw. 1998) (citation omitted).
31o RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 3.15 cmt. d (zoo6) (citations omit-
ted).
311 United States ex rel. Miller v. Bill Harbert Int'l Constr., Inc., 505 F Supp. zd 20, 32
(D.D.C. 2007); AYH Holdings, Inc. v. Avreco, Inc., 8z6 N.E.2d I I 1, 1126 (111. App. Ct. 2005)
(quoting 3 AM. JUR. 2D Agency § 163 (2002)).
312 See Whalen v. DeGraff, Foy, Conway, Holt-Harris & Mealey, 863 N.Y.S.2d 1oo, 1o1
(N.Y. App. Div. zoo8) (providing timing of Bailey's knowledge).
313 See, e.g., id. at 102.
314 Id. at 1o.
315 Id. at 102.
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Subagents owe duties to their appointing agents.31 6 A lawyer functioning
as a subagent is still "personally liable" for her own negligence 3 7-that
liability simply flows to the referring lawyer rather than to the client.
Returning to Whalen once more, DeGraff presumably planned its own claim
against Bailey, and it is reasonable to assume that Bailey will ultimately be
held liable for its error.
For lawyers who wish to avoid joint or vicarious liability, salvation
potentially lies in carefully-crafted engagement letters spelling out
for clients the division of responsibilities between co-counsel. 318 This
practice should defeat allegations of joint or vicarious liability based on
alleged subagency or shared responsibility for a representation, although
it is doubtful whether it will be effective where co-counsel must assume
joint responsibility for a representation to be able to divide fees. 319 While
it might be argued that a lawyer could be professionally disciplined for
dividing fees with co-counsel, if she and the other lawyer craft insulating
engagement agreements and still avoid joint or vicarious liability, because
ethics requirements and tort liability are separate concerns, that argument
should fail. To rule otherwise would allow lawyers to flaunt their ethical
obligations."'
Finally, there are times when clients, rather than lawyers, retain co-
counsel. In such matters, it is generally the case that neither lawyer should
be vicariously liable for the other's alleged negligence or misconduct.3"'
C. Local Counsel Relationships
The term "local counsel" typically describes a lawyer who practices in
the city, county or state in which litigation is pending and who handles
tasks requiring local knowledge or presence on behalf of a client whose
316 RESTATEMENT (TIIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 3.15 cmt. d (206) (citations omit-
ted).
317 Boskoffv. Yano, 57 E Supp. 2d 994, 999 (D. Haw. 1998).
318 Duggins v. Guardianship of Washington, 632 So. 2d 420, 426 (Miss. 1993).
319 Compare 1 MALLEN & SMITH, SUpra note 12, § 5:9, at 68o ("An agreement... with the
client concerning the division of legal representation can prevent the liability for errors com-
mitted by the other attorney."), with MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e)(1) (2009)
(permitting the division of fees between lawyers in different firms only if "the division is in
proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibil-
ity for the representation"), andAiello v. Adar, 750 N.YS.zd 457,465 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (find-
ing that "joint responsibility" in analogous professional conduct rule "is synonymous with
joint and several liability").
320 See Noris v. Silver, 701 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to allow a
lawyer to avoid vicarious liability where fee splitting agreement violated ethics rule).
321 See, e.g., Michael H. Bloom, P.A. v. Dorta-Duque, 743 So. zd 1202, 1203 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that a lawyer could not be held vicariously liable for the acts of a
second lawyer hired directly by the client).
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lead counsel practices elsewhere. Local counsel's specific duties and
responsibilities are generally determined by agreement between local
counsel, lead counsel, and their mutual client, as well as by court rules.
Local counsel owe a duty of care to their clients even if they are playing
a secondary role to lead counsel.3"' The standards to be applied to local
counsel's performance are the same as those applied to lead counsel.3"3 The
difference in most cases is that local counsel's services are more limited
than those provided by lead counsel, and any duties they owe to clients
are generally confined to the responsibilities or tasks delegated to them by
lead counsel.
3 4
Controversies involving local counsel often relate to their alleged duty
to the client when lead counsel is negligent or guilty of a fiduciary breach.
The claim here is that local counsel should have prevented the other
lawyer's error or misconduct. The problem for aggrieved clients is that local
counsel generally have no duty beyond the scope of the representations
to which they agree.32 5 To hold otherwise would contradict the parties'
agreement and knowledge3 6 and increase clients' costs.32 7 That said, local
counsel may not contractually limit their duties or responsibilities to the
point that they fall below those "expressly or impliedly imposed by the
relevant rules of practice pertaining to the association of local counsel."
32 8
This principle typically applies to representations in which local counsel
move to admit lead counsel pro hac vice and thus become subject to court
rules governing local counsel's role in the case.32 9
In Curb Records v. Adams &ReeseL.L.P, the plaintiff retained a California
lawyer, Peter Strong, to defend it in litigation in the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana.33 Curb Records authorized Strong to
employ local counsel in Louisiana and to fix local counsel's authority as
he saw fit.33 1 Strong accordingly engaged Richard Goins, a partner with
322 Ortiz v. Barrett, 278 S.E.zd 833, 838 (Va. 198I).
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 See, e.g., Macawber Eng'g, Inc. v. Robson & Miller, 47 E3d 253, 256-58 (8th Cir. 1995)
(construing Minnesota law and a local federal court rule); Glantz v. Rosenberg, 633 N.Y.S.2d
77, 78 (N.Y. App. Div. Y995) (holding that local counsel had no duty to appear at a hearing lead
counsel missed); Armor v. Lantz, 535 S.E.zd 737, 750 (W. Va. 2000) (finding no breach of duty
where local counsel did not agree to perform legal analysis that lead counsel botched); Ortiz,
278 S.E.2d at 838-40 (finding no malpractice by local counsel).
326 Armor, 535 S.E.zd at 749.
327 MacawberEng'g, Inc., 47 F3d at 257-58.
328 Armor, 535 S.E.2d at 749.
329 See, e.g., Ingemi v. Pelino & Lentz, 866 E Supp. 156, 159, 161-62 (D.N.J. 1994).
330 Curb Records v. Adams & Reese L.L.P., No. 98-3136o, 1999 WL 1240800, at *1-z
(5th Cir. Nov. 29, 1999).
331 Id. at z.
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Adams & Reese in New Orleans.33 Strong told Goins that his role as local
counsel would be limited to "[1] receiving discovery requests, pleadings
and court orders, and forwarding them to Strong ... [and] [2] filing and
serving pleadings and documents, such as Strong might instruct."3 33 Strong
expressly instructed Goins not to communicate with Curb.
334
Discovery proceeded, with Goins forwarding plaintiffs' discovery
requests to Strong as directed at the outset.35 Goins soon became aware
that Strong was not responding to the discovery requests and the district
court thereafter sanctioned Curb for its refusal to participate in discovery;
Strong paid the sanctions by personal check. 33  Eventually, the district
court struck Curb's defenses as a discovery sanction. 3 7 Curb was forced to
settle the litigation on unfavorable terms and it thereafter sued Goins for
legal malpractice. 338 The district court granted Goins summary judgment
and Curb appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
The district court had granted Goins summary judgment based on his
contract with Strong, which narrowly limited Goins' duties and forbade
him from communicating with Curb.339 As the district court saw it, Goins
owed Curb no duty as a matter of basic agency and contract law.340 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed, reasoning that under Louisiana
law, "the duties owed by an attorney to his client transcend the bounds of
an ordinary contractual relationship."' 41 Forced by a lack of precedent to
predict how the Louisiana Supreme Court would rule, the Fifth Circuit
framed the issue as whether Louisiana law imposed "an inherent and
nondelegable duty requiring local counsel to report directly to its client
any known instances of malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of lead
counsel."z
In making this prediction, the court was first persuaded by the
testimony of Curb's expert witness, who testified that standard practice in
the venue precluded Goins from placing reliance in discovery matters on
Strong.343 The expert further opined that a lawyer's fiduciary duty, as locally
understood, included a duty to advise a client "in a manner to protect [the
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Id. at *2 n.4.
339 Id. at *3 (citing Curb Records, Inc. v. Adams & Reese, L.L.P., No. CIV. A. 96-2908,
1998 WL 12o365, at *12 (E.D. La. Mar. i8, 1998)).
340 Id.
341 Id. at *4.
342 Id.
343 Id. at *5.
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client] from itself."344 Second, Louisiana case law supported the expert's
testimony by indicating that a lawyer serving as local counsel has a duty
"to insure that the client is not being misguided or relying on erroneous
advice that will result in an uninformed or unadvised decision.' ' s Third,
the court was persuaded by Louisiana Rule of Professional Conduct 1.4,
which obligated Goins to keep Curb informed of significant developments
in the representation. 346 While none of these factors squarely addressed
the issue at hand, the court concluded that Louisiana law imposed on local
counsel "an inherent nondelegable duty to report directly to [a] client any
known instances of malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of lead counsel
that an objectively reasonable lawyer in the locality would conclude are
seriously prejudicial to the client's interests."3 7
Continuing, the Fifth Circuit observed that "when the client has vested
lead counsel with primary responsibility for controlling and conducting the
litigation, local counsel's direct obligations to the client are substantially
lessened." 3" Further, local counsel have no duty to notify the client when
they disagree with lead counsel's ordinary professional judgments or
strategies. 349 Local counsel cannot, however, "turn a blind eye" to lead
counsel's willful disregard of court orders when it should be clear that such
misconduct will seriously impair the client's interests.35 0
The court recognized that imposing such a duty on local counsel would
raise a number of potential concerns related to the duplication of efforts,
increased costs to the client, additional burdens on local counsel, and the
like.35' Nonetheless, where "it is clear to a reasonable attorney" that a client
will be substantially prejudiced by lead counsel's misconduct or neglect,
"the duty of care under Louisiana law requires local counsel to notify the
client of lead counsel's action or inaction," regardless of lead counsel's
excuses, instructions, or strategies.35 Accordingly, the court reversed the
district court's grant of summary judgment for Goins and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
35 3
Goins knew that Strong was performing erratically and that Curb's
case could suffer as a result.3 4 In this context, imposing upon similarly
344 Id.
345 Id.
346 Id. (citing LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(3) (2009)).
347 Id. at *6.
348 Id.
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 Id. (quoting Macawber Eng'g, Inc. v. Robson & Miller, 47 F3d 253, 257-58 (8th Cir.
1995)).
352 Id.
353 Id. at '7.
354 See id. at "2.
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situated lawyers a duty to inform clients of lead counsel's misconduct or to
share their concerns with a client seems reasonable. Even so, courts must
recognize that lawyers serving as local counsel are not guarantors of lead
counsel's good conduct, as Masone v. Levine illustrates.3"'
In Masone, Leon Grauer agreed to serve as local counsel in New Jersey
for an out-of-state lawyer, Carl Levine.3 6 Grauer supported Levine'sprohac
vice admission so they could defend a company called ATI in environmental
litigation, with Levine as lead counsel and Grauer as local counsel. 357 At a
settlement conference in the ATI litigation, Levine spoke with an adjuster
for ATI's insurer out of Grauer's earshot and thereafter represented that the
insurer would fund the environmental remediation costs underlying the
litigation. 38 The insurer's participation in the settlement was critical to the
plaintiff, Nicolas Masone, who otherwise feared that ATI would not honor
its bargain.35 9 In fact, Levine was lying; ATI's insurer had not authorized
the settlement.360 Masone's fears were realized when ATI went bankrupt
without completing the remediation and its insurer denied coverage.
361
Masone then sued Levine and Grauer for negligence and negligent
misrepresentation.
3 61
Masone insisted that Grauer's service as local counsel made him
responsible for Levine's misrepresentation. This argument rested on a
New Jersey court rule concerning pro hac vice admissions that made local
counsel responsible "for the conduct of the cause and of the admitted
attorney therein."' The court in Masone disagreed, thinking it unreasonable
to read the rule as imposing "virtually absolute liability" on local counsel
for pro hac vice counsel's misdeeds. 36 There was no evidence that Grauer
knew of Levine's misrepresentation at any relevant time, and the court was
unwilling to extend Grauer's rule-imposed responsibility for the conduct
of the ATI litigation to that of an indemnitor or insurer of Levine's acts.
3
1'
Accordingly, it affirmed summary judgment for Grauer.
3 67
In conclusion, lawyers who serve as local counsel must exercise care
in doing so. By signing pleadings, local counsel are generally warranting
355 Masone v. Levine, 887 A.2d 1191, I 197 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005).
356 Id. at 1192.
357 Id. at 1193.
358 Id.
359 See id. at I195.
360 Id. at 1194.
36i Id.
362 Id.
363 Id. at i 96.
364 Id. (quoting N.J. CT. R. i:21-2(c)(4)).
365 Id. at 1197.
366 Id.
367 Id.
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to a court that the pleadings have a proper purpose, set forth legitimate
contentions, and are factually supportable.3 6  Local counsel may be
sanctioned for violating related court rules if these things prove to be false.
This is true even if lead counsel prepared the pleadings or provided all of
the information on which a pleading was based.369 Lawyers who function as
local counsel assume all ethical duties that attend any other representation
in litigation, as courts routinely note.37 While they cannot contract out of
obligations imposed by court rules, lawyers who serve as local counsel are
wise to clearly limit or condition their representations in their engagement
agreements. If they do not, they risk assuming duties far exceeding their
expectations or well beyond those commensurate with their compensation.
Lawyers should probably decline local counsel engagements that relegate
them to "mail drop" roles, or that make them uncomfortable because of the
description of their intended roles or the nature of the litigation. The risks
of a representation should never outweigh the rewards.
III. COMMON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY CONCERNS
So far, our discussion of co-counsel's duties has primarily focused on
professional liability. It is now time to examine some key ethical aspects
of co-counsel relationships. These include (a) the duty to inform a client
of another lawyer's malpractice or fiduciary breach, (b) lawyers' supervisory
duties under Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1, and (c) the division
of legal fees between lawyers in different firms, or "fee-splitting."
A. The Duty to Inform the Client of Co-Counsel's Misconduct
Lawyers' duty to communicate with their clients is essential to the
attorney-client relationship, regardless of the specific nature of the
representation. This duty is primarily enforced through Model Rule 1.4,
which provides:
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with
respect to which the client's informed consent... is required by these
368 See FED. R. Civ. P. i i(b).
369 Val-Land Farms, Inc. v. Third Nat'l Bank, 937 E2d 1110, 1117-18 (6th Cir. 1991);
Ideal Instruments, Inc. v. Rivard Instruments, Inc., 243 ER.D. 322, 348 (N.D. Iowa 2007)
(quoting Val-Land Farms, Inc., 937 F.2d at 11I8); Schottenstein v. Schottenstein, 23o F.R.D.
355,361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Lewis v. Celina Fin. Corp., 655 N.E.2d 1333, 1338 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995) (citing Val-LandFarms, Inc., 937 F.zd at 1117-18).
370 See, e.g., Romero v. Cajun Stabilizing Boats, Inc., Civil Action No. o6-263, 2007 WL
4180599, at *2 n.5 (W.D. La. Nov. 21, 2007) (reminding local counsel of their responsibility to
the court at all stages of proceedings), overruled on other grounds by Romero v. Cajun Stabilizing
Boats, Inc., 307 Fed. App'x 849 (5th Cir. 2009).
[Vol. 98
SCORPIONS IN A BOTTLE?
Rules;
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the
client's objectives are to be accomplished;
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and
(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's
conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not
permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.
(b)A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.
3 1
Of course, lawyers would have a duty to communicate with their clients
even in the absence of Rule 1.4 because the attorney-client relationship
is a fiduciary relationship, such that the lawyer must communicate to the
client information that the client needs to know.372 The attorney-client
relationship is also characterized as an agency relationship, and agents
generally must provide their principals with information related to the
subject of the agency.3
Lawyers' duties under Rule 1.4 are mandatory, not aspirational.
37 4
Moreover, the duty to communicate is an affirmative obligation in the sense
that lawyers must initiate communications; they generally cannot rely on
clients to do so. At the same time, the obligation to keep a client informed
about the status of a matter is tempered by reason. 375 Lawyers need not
apprise clients of all details of their representations. A lawyer is not required
to communicate with a client as often as the client desires, "as long as the
attorney's conduct [is] reasonable under the circumstances. '37 6 This rule
of reason applies both to the lawyer's duty to initiate communications or
volunteer information, and to respond to a client's inquiries.377
It is generally accepted that a lawyer's ethical duty to communicate
includes a duty to inform the client of the lawyer's conduct giving rise to
a potential malpractice claim. 38 Lawyers' fiduciary duties to clients also
371 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2009).
372 Estate of Spencer v. Gavin, 946 A.2d io5I, lO64 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. zoo8).
373 RESTATEMENT (ThIRD) OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 8. 11 cmt. b (zoo6).
374 State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Schraeder, 51 P.3 d 570
, 576-77 (Okla. 2002).
375 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DzlENKOWSKI, LEGAL ETHICS: ThE LAWYER'S
DESKaOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY § 1.4-I, at 134 (2009-1o ed.).
376 In reSchoeneman, 777 A.2d 259, 264 (D.C. 2001).
377 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES,IME LAW OF LAWYERING § 7.3, at 7-6
(3d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2003).
378 See LAWRENCE J. Fox & SUSAN R. MARTYN, RED FLAGS: A LAWYER'S HANDBOOK ON
LEGAL ETHICS § 4.07(a), at 81 (2005) (explaining a lawyer's duty to inform the client of mis-
takes made in representation); RESTATEMENT (TI hIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 20
cmt. c (2000) (recognizing a duty to disclose "substantial" malpractice).
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require them to disclose acts of malpractice.379 These duties exist in co-
counsel representations just as in all others. The errant lawyer's duty to
inform the client exists regardless of another lawyer's involvement in the
representation. The more interesting issue is whether a lawyer filling a
co-counsel role has an ethical duty to inform the client of the other lawyer's
potential malpractice or substantial misconduct. Such a duty seems
to clearly exist in light of a recent New Jersey case, Estate of Spencer v.
Gavin.380
In Estate ofSpencer, Kathryn Spencer, as executrix, retained Daniel Gavin
to represent the estates of her mother and sister who predeceased her.
381
Kathryn also named Gavin as administrator in her own will.382 Accordingly,
when Kathryn died, Gavin became the administrator of all three estates
as planned. 383 At about the same time, Gavin was looking to reduce his
workload, so he asked other attorneys in the building where he kept his
office to handle discrete tasks and transferred client files to them. 38 Dean
Averna was one of the lawyers to whom Gavin often turned for assistance,
which led to the perception that Averna was slowly assuming charge of
Gavin's practice.381 With particular respect to the Spencer estates, Averna
(1) formed a related entity to manage and disburse assets of Kathryn's estate
for charitable purposes, the Spencer Foundation, at Gavin's request, and
(2) drafted a contract between the Spencer Foundation and a builder.
386
Gavin paid Averna for his work by checks drawn on the account of one of
the estates.387 Averna, however, had no formal engagement agreement with
Gavin or the estates for either project.
31
Unfortunately, Gavin pillaged the Spencer estates, and Averna was
allegedly aware of Gavin's thefts. 3 89 Gavin died of cancer less than a year
after Kathryn's death and a substitute administrator, Erik Shanni, was
appointed for the Spencer estates several months later.3" Shanni discovered
the massive thefts and, after obtaining partial reimbursement from the
New Jersey Client Protection Fund, sued a number of defendants on
behalf of the estates, including Averna.391 The trial court granted summary
379 Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP, 167 P.3d 666, 673 (Cal. 2007).
380 Estate of Spencer v. Gavin, 9 4 6 A.zd io5I (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2oo8).
381 Id. at 1055.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 1057.
384 Id. at io56.
385 Id.
386 Id. at 1058.
387 Id. at xo65.
388 See id.
389 Id. at IO58.
390 Id. at io59.
391 Id. at 1o59-6o.
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judgment for Averna, reasoning that he did not share an attorney-client
relationship with the estates and had no duty to police Gavin's conduct. 392
The plaintiffs appealed.
The critical issue on appeal was whether Averna had a duty to the
Spencer estates to report Gavin's misappropriations. 393 The court noted
that a lawyer, as a fiduciary, has a duty to look out for a client's best interests
and communicate information that the client needs to know.39 Be that as
it may, Averna argued, he did not have an attorney-client relationship with
the Spencer estates and thus owed them no duty.3 95 The court rejected
this "myopic contention" for several reasons. 39  First, Averna prepared
the documents forming the Spencer Foundation pursuant to a specific
directive in Kathryn Spencer's will.39 Second, Gavin paid him for his work
in his capacity as executor of Kathryn Spencer's estate by checks drawn
on the estate's account.3 98 Third, Averna could not have represented
only the Spencer Foundation at the time of its formation because it did
not then exist.399 Instead, had Averna been unable to form the Spencer
Foundation, he still had one or more clients to whom he was accountable
in the undertaking.0 It was therefore possible that he represented the
plaintiffs and, indeed, the court was satisfied that Averna represented
Kathryn Spencer's estate in forming the Spencer Foundation. 401 Regardless,
all of the Spencer estates plainly relied on Averna to represent their best
interests, and he therefore owed them a duty of care even if they were not
clients.401
Once the court determined that Averna owed the Spencer estates
fiduciary duties as clients or non-client beneficiaries of his services, it
easily concluded that he had a duty to report Gavin's misappropriations
if he indeed knew about them.403 This conclusion was buttressed first
by Averna's "close and regular working relationship with Gavin," which
"reinforce[d] the fairness of imposing certain duties upon [Averna] as a
consequence of that proximity."4 Second, the court found support in
New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 8.3(a), which requires lawyers
392 Id. at io6i.
393 Id. at io54.
394 Id. at IO64.
395 Id
396 Id.
397 Id. at io64-65.
398 Id. at io65.
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 Id. at IO66-67.
402 Id. at lO67.
403 Id.
404 Id. at io68.
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to report serious misconduct by other lawyers to appropriate professional
authorities. 4°0 While violations of New Jersey ethics rules are not themselves
civilly actionable, Averna's alleged failure to honor his duty under Rule
8.3(a) strengthened the court's conclusion that his inaction should expose
him to liability to the Spencer estates.406
The Estate of Spencer court vacated the summary judgment for Averna
and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 4 7 The
critical issues on remand would be whether Averna knew of Gavin's
dishonesty and, if so, when he learned of it.408
Estate of Spencer supports the recognition of a duty to inform a client
of co-counsel's negligence or other misconduct as an aspect of a lawyer's
fiduciary duty of loyalty. In fact, this must be the case, because a lawyer's
fiduciary duty of loyalty includes the obligation to "mak[e] known to the
client all information that is significant and material to the matter that is
the subject of [their] relationship," 9 and a lawyer's potential malpractice
or fiduciary breach is plainly the failure to do just that. The same duty
clearly exists under Model Rule 1.4, as well. Rule 1.4(a)(2) obligates a
lawyer to "reasonably consult with the client about the means by which
the client's objectives are to be accomplished,' 410 and the lawyer's potential
malpractice is a critical component of those means. Rule 1.4(b) compels a
lawyer to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the
client to make informed decisions regarding the representation, ' 41 and the
lawyer's potential malpractice will surely influence the client's decisions
concerning the representation-such as whether to retain the lawyer.
Model Rule 8.3(a) is a much less certain basis for imposing a duty to
inform a client of co-counsel's stumble or dishonesty. Rule 8.3(a) provides
that "[a] lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation
of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question
as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects, shall inform the appropriate professional authority. ' 412 This rule
was arguably relevant in Estate of Spencer because Gavin's misappropriation
unquestionably implicated his honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a
lawyer, but many cases do not involve such glaring misconduct. For example,
an isolated incident of negligence seldom evidences a lawyer's unfitness to
practice and would not compel co-counsel to report the offending lawyer
405 Id. at io69.
406 Id. (citing Baxt v. Liloia, 714 A.zd 271, 274 (N.J. 1998)).
407 Id. at 1072.
408 Id. at 1071.
409 Frederick Rd. Ltd. P'ship v. Brown & Sturm, 756 A.2d 963, 977 (Md. 2000).
410 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(a)(2) (2009).
411 Id. at 1.4(b).
412 Id. at 8.3(a).
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to professional authorities." 3 Besides, Rule 8.3(a) mandates reporting to
professional authorities; it says nothing about informing clients. 414 For these
reasons, there are stronger bases for requiring lawyers to inform clients of
malpractice or other misconduct by co-counsel than Rule 8.3(a).
B. Lawyers' Supervisory Duties
Co-counsel ordinarily have no duty to supervise one another's
performance. 41s But a client may structure a co-counsel relationship such
that one lawyer supervises the other, or co-counsel may so agree between
themselves. In addition, co-counsel who are not in the same firm and who
are not both performing services must accept "joint responsibility" for a
representation in order to divide a fee,4 16 which "entails financial and ethical
responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were associated in a
partnership. 4 1 7 All of this points to the potential application of Model Rule
5.1 to co-counsel relationships. Rule 5.1 provides:
(a) A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with
other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving
reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm conform to the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
(b) A lawyer having direct supervisory authority over another lawyer shall
make reasonable efforts to ensure that the other lawyer conforms to the
Rules of Professional Conduct.
(c) A lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct if:
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner or has comparable managerial authority in
the law firm in which the other lawyer practices, or has direct supervisory
authority over the other lawyer, and knows of the conduct at a time
when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take
413 See, e.g.,Tex. Prof'l Ethics Comm., Op. 523 (1997), available at 1997 WL 862532, at
*3
414 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2oo9).
415 See CVC Capital Corp. v. Weil, Gotshal, Manges, 595 N.Y.S.2d 458, 458 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1993) (holding that even if the attorneys owed a duty to supervise a firm retained by the
client, no duty existed to independently verify factual reports made by those attorneys).
416 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUT R. 1.5(e)(1) (2009) (allowing division of fee if
joint responsibility assumed or if "division is in proportion to the services performed by each
lawyer").
417 Id. at 1.5 cmt. 7.
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reasonable remedial action.41
Although Rule 5.1 is typically applied to conduct involving lawyers in the
same firm or organization, it is not so limited.
419
Rule 5.1(a) potentially applies only to co-counsel relationships in which
the lawyers are dividing a fee but not each performing services in proportion
to the way the fees will be allocated, because it is only in that situation that
they each must assume joint responsibility for the representation. 4 0 Even
then, its application is sketchy. If Rule 5.1(a) does apply, the most that can
be said is that co-counsel must make "reasonable efforts" to ensure that
their respective firms have policies and procedures "designed to detect and
resolve conflicts of interest, identify dates by which actions must be taken
in pending matters, account for client funds and property [in connection
with the representation] and ensure that inexperienced lawyers are
properly supervised. ' 42 ' Alternatively, if one lawyer arranges for a second
lawyer's participation, the first lawyer must do the following: (1) remain
"sufficiently aware" of the second lawyer's performance in order to be able
to ascertain whether the second lawyer's conduct conforms to applicable
ethics rules, including being available to the client to respond to questions
or concerns; (2) select the second lawyer based solely on legal ability and
not on willingness to enter a fee splitting agreement; and (3) assume
financial responsibility for the matter, even if ancillary to that assumed by
the second lawyer.
421
Rule 5.1(b) requires a lawyer with "direct supervisory authority over
another lawyer" to "make reasonable efforts to ensure" that the supervised
lawyer conforms to ethics rules.42 3 Whether one lawyer has direct supervisory
authority over another depends on the facts. 424 A lawyer need not be the day-
to-day supervisor of the other lawyer for the rule to apply.425 A supervisory
lawyer may violate the rule even if she did not control the details of the
other lawyer's work or is unaware of the misconduct. 4 6 Regardless, lawyers'
418 Id. at 5.1.
4I9 See Neilson v. McCloskey, 186 S.W.3d 285, 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 2oo5) (noting Rule 5.I'S
application in a case involving lawyers in different firms).
420 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e)() & R. 1.5 cmt. 7 (2009).
421 Id. at 5.I cmt. 2.
422 State Bar of Wis. CLE Books, Formal Op. E-oo-oi (Sept. zooo), available at
http://www.wisbar.org/AMrTemplate.cfm?Section=Legal-Research&TEMPLATE=/CM/
ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=3 1986.
423 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(b) (zoo9).
424 Id. at 5. 1 cmt. 5; see also In r Anonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.zd 10, 13
(S.C. 2001).
425 In re Anonymous, 552 S.E.2d at 13 (citing In re Moore, 494 S.E.zd 804, 807 (S.C.
1997))-
426 See, e.g., In re Wilkinson, 805 So. 2d 142, 145-47 (La. 2ooz) (suspending lawyer for
violating Rules 5.I(b) and 5.3(b) when law clerk-turned-associate never told the lawyer of
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liability under Rule 5.1(b) is direct rather than vicarious. 42 7
Under Rule 5.1 (c), a lawyer is responsible for another lawyer's violation
of ethics rules if (1) "the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific
conduct, ratifies the conduct involved,' 428 or (2) the lawyer has "direct
supervisory authority" over the other lawyer, and knows of the other lawyer's
conduct "at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but
fails to take reasonable remedial action. ' 4 9 Rule 5.1(c)(1) is consistent with
Model Rule 8.4(a), which makes it "professional misconduct" for a lawyer
to "knowingly assist or induce" another lawyer to violate ethics rules, or
to violate such rules through the acts of an agent.430 A lawyer who violates
Rule 5.1(c)(1) necessarily violates Rule 8.4(a) as well.43' As noted above,
Rule 5.1(c)(2) imposes corrective or curative duties on supervisory lawyers
in certain circumstances. The nature of those duties and remedial actions
to be taken depends on the "immediacy" of the supervisory lawyer's
involvement and the "seriousness of the misconduct" to be avoided or
mitigated.
431
Although Rule 5.1(c) superficially appears to make lawyers vicariously
liable for misconduct by lawyers they supervise, that perception is incorrect.
433
Liability under Rule 5.1(c) is not vicarious "because the obligation does
not arise merely from the relationship between the attorneys."' 34 Lawyers'
violation of Rule 5.1(c) depends on their participation in the subject
misconduct or their failure to prevent or mitigate it.
435
C. Fee-Splitting
In many co-counsel representations, the lawyers agree to divide fees
between themselves. This is typically the case when the lawyers are to be
compensated through a contingent fee. Unfortunately, these arrangements
go wrong with alarming frequency, leaving the lawyers destructively pitted
against one another like scorpions in a bottle.4 36
relevant events and the lawyer was otherwise unaware of them).
427 In re Anonymous, 552 S.E.zd at 14.
428 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(c)(1) (2oo9).
429 Id. at 5.1(c)(2).
430 Id. at 8.4(a).
431 See, e.g., In re Asher, 772 A.2d ii61, 1I69-7o (D.C. 2001) (finding Rule 5.1(c) and
8.4(a) violations where lawyer instructed a lawyer formerly in his employ to lie to the court).
432 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1 cmt. 5 (2oo9).
433 See In reAnonymous Member of the S.C. Bar, 552 S.E.2d 10, 13 (S.C. zooi).
434 Id.
435 Id.
436 See, e.g., Steven R. Perles, P.C. v. Kagy, 473 E3d 1244, i246 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("Like a
contentious corporate merger or a sizable family inheritance, a large contingency fee in a suc-
cessful lawsuit sometimes leads to nasty controversy over who gets what. This case is a fine
example."); Edell & Assocs. v. Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, 264 F3d 424,429-35 (4th Cir.
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Lawyers in different firms may divide fees under narrow
circumstances, a practice commonly referred to as "fee-splitting. '437 For
example, Model Rule 1.5(e) provides:
(e) A division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm may
be made only if:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer
or each lawyer assumes joint responsibiliyt for the representation;
(2) the client agrees to the arrangement, including the share each
lawyer will receive, and the agreement is confirmed in writing; and
(3) the total fee is reasonable.4-8
California, which does not follow the Model Rules, has its own rule:
(A) A member shall not divide a fee for legal services with a lawyer who is
not a partner of, associate of, or shareholder with the member unless:
(1) The client has consented in writing thereto after a full disclosure
has been made in writing that a division of fees will be made and the
terms of such division; and
(2) The total fee charged by all lawyers is not increased solely by reason
of the provisiono for division of fees and is not unconcionable as that
term is defined in rule 4-200.
411
The restrictions on fee-splitting found in Model Rule 1.5(e) and
similar provisions are supported by at least two rationales. First, courts
and the legal profession as a whole have long found commercial methods
of obtaining clients to be distasteful. 440 In this vein, restrictions on fee-
splitting are intended to prevent lawyers from "brokering in clients.""
Second, restrictions on fee-splitting aid in policing conflicts of interest.
They do this by preventing lawyers who cannot handle matters because
of conflicts from nonetheless collecting fees for them, 442 and by controlling
against conflicts of interest inherent in representations in which lawyers
zoos) (involving division of $i. i billion contingent fee).
437 "Fee-splitting" also refers to arrangements in which lawyers share fees with non-
lawyers, which ethics rules generally prohibit. SeeMODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(a)
(2009). Lawyers who are on inactive status with a relevant state's bar may be treated as non-
lawyers with respect to prohibited fee-splitting. See, e.g., Morris & Doherty, P.C. v. Lockwood,
672 N.W.zd 884, 892 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
438 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2009).
439 CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. z-zoo(A) (2009).
440 ROTUNDA & DzsENKOWSKI, supra note 375, § 1.5-4(b), at 184-85.
441 Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Chasnoff, 783 A.zd 224, 232 (Md. zoos) (quot-
ing CARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODEN. LEGAL ETHICS § 9.2.4, at 5 10 (1986)); Cleveland Bar Ass'n
v. Mishler, 886 N.E.zd 818, 824 (Ohio 2oo8).
442 ROTUNDA & DZlENKOWSKI,SUpra note 375, § 1.5-4(b), at 184.
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divide fees." 3
Returning now to Rule 1.5(e), which has been adopted in most
jurisdictions, the first question to be answered in any fee-splitting dispute
is whether the lawyers involved are "in the same firm."' If they are,
fee-splitting is no concern.445 Lawyers who are otherwise independent
contractors may be deemed to be in the same firm if they hold themselves
out to clients as having such a relationship, or practice together "as a
single, collective business entity."446 This is a fact-dependent inquiry."7
A lawyer who maintains a solo practice may also be in the same firm with
other lawyers by virtue of an "of counsel" relationship with that firm."
On the other hand, lawyers who merely share office space are not in the
same firm for fee-splitting purposes as long as they do not "divulge or share
client confidences to take advantage of the collective experience of [their
associationl." 449 In short, determining whether lawyers are in the same firm
in this context is not always the simple task that one might presume it to
be.
Assuming that the lawyers are not in the same firm, they may divide a
fee only if(1) the division is in proportion to the services that each performs
or (2) they each assume joint responsibility for the representation.4 0 These
are alternative requirements.41 Regarding the first, there is no uniform
measure of proportionality. Courts are generally reluctant to inquire into
the "precise worth" of each lawyer's services absent a glaring discrepancy
between their contributions. 42 The services performed may be the actual
handling of the case or, in some states, may also be the assumption of
financial responsibility for the matter 5.4 3 Either way, each lawyer must
443 Mark v. Spencer, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 569, 572-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
444 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e) (2009).
445 Tomar, Seliger, Simonoff, Adourian & O'Brien, P.C. v. Snyder, 6oi A.zd 1o56, 1059
(Del. Super. Ct. 199o) ("By its own terms, Rule 1.5(e) does not apply to lawyers who are in
the same firm.").
446 Welch v. Davis, 114 S.W.3d z85, 29o (Mo. Ct. App. zoo3).
447 Commonwealth v. Allison, 751 N.E.2d 868, 889 (Mass. 2001).
448 See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 90-357 (199o) (dis-
cussing "of counsel" relationships).
449 See Allison, 751 N.E.2d at 89o-91; see also Duff v. Gary, 622 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993) (involving two lawyers who shared office and secretarial expenses, but did not
practice together, there, the court noted that even if they associated on some cases, they were
not in the same firm for division of fee purposes).
450 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. s.5(e)(i) (2009).
451 See In re Hailey, 792 N.E.zd 851,862 (Ind. 2oo3).
452 See Graham v. Corona Group Home, 754 N.Y.S.2d 362, 363-64 (N.Y App. Div. 2003)
(quoting Benjamin v. Koeppel, 650 N.E.zd 829, 832 (N.Y. 1995)) (discussing an identical re-
quirement in the New York rule).
453 Neilson v. McCloskey, 186 S.W.3d 285, 287 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
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do her fair share.4" With respect to the second requirement, "joint
responsibility" means both responsibility of a "supervisory lawyer" under
Rule 5.1 and assumption of malpractice liability.455 As a comment to Rule
1.5 explains, "Uloint responsibility for [a] representation entails financial
and ethical responsibility for the representation as if the lawyers were
associated in a partnership. '45 6 It should be noted, however, that it is not
the division of fees that creates joint responsibility; rather, lawyers who
are not both providing services must accept joint responsibility in order to
divide fees. The lawyers are simply assuming duties that would otherwise
not exist in order to achieve a desired financial result. When circumstances
permit, therefore, it is safer from a professional responsibility and liability
perspective for lawyers to structure a co-counsel relationship such that each
performs discrete services according to a division blessed by the client.
Under Rule 1.5(e)(2), the client must agree in writing to the lawyers'
division of fees, including the share that each will receive.4 7 The writing
requirement protects clients' best interests by ensuring that they control the
selection of their counsel and know the details of their representations.
458
Rule 1.5(e) is silent with respect to the timing of the agreement and it
therefore follows that the client may agree any time before the fee is
divided.459 If lawyers initially obtain a client's agreement to X division and
later change their minds and opt for Ydivision, they must obtain the client's
agreement to the new arrangement as well. The writing requirement
may be satisfied by a document prepared by any lawyer involved or by
one to which all lawyers subscribe, 460 or even by a document prepared by
the client. Written confirmation need not take the form of a stand-alone
document; lawyers may provide for the division of fees in their engagement
agreements. 46
454 Id. (citing Risjord v. Lewis, 987 S.W.2d 403,406 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)) ("If an attorney
wants a share of the fee, he must perform an appropriate share of the legal services in the
case.").
455 ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 375, § 1.5-4(c), at 188.
456 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5 cmt. 7 (2009).
457 Id. at 1.5(e)(2).
458 Christensen v. Eggen, 577 N.W.2d 221, 225 (Minn. 1998).
459 See Cohen v. Brown, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 24,38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing California
Rule of Professional Conduct 2-zoo, which is also silent on timing). Butsee Saggese v. Kelley,
837 N.E.2d 699, 706 (Mass. 2005) (requiring client consent to fee division before co-counsel
are hired).
460 See Robert P. Lynn, Jr., LLC v. Purcell, 835 N.Y.S.zd 664, 666 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)
(interpreting a similar provision in the New York rule).
461 See, e.g., Rice, Steinberg & Stutin, P.A. v. Cummings, Cummings & Dudenhefer, 716
So. zd 8, 16 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (finding no Rule I.5(e) violation where engagement agree-
ment included relevant provision); McCord & Burns Law Firm v. Piuze, 752 N.W.zd 580, 587
(Neb. zoo8) (construing fee-sharing provision in retainer agreement).
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Finally, the total fee to be divided must be reasonable.4 6 The lawyers
cannot ratchet up the total fee to recover compensation lost in division.
The reasonableness of the total fee charged to the client will generally be
judged according to the factors in Rule 1.5(a).4 The Rule 1.5(a) factors
are not exclusive, however, and courts and disciplinary authorities may
consider other factors in appropriate cases. 6
Lawyers who violate rules against fee-splitting face discipline even if
their conduct does not harm clients.6 Lawyers whose conduct in dividing
fees is challenged, however, are rarely as concerned about professional
discipline as they are with the enforceability of their agreements and the
attendant effect on their compensation. As a rule, agreements to divide fees
that violate Rule 1.5(e) are unenforceable.46 This is consistent with the
view that ethics rules express public policy, such that a contract violating
them is unenforceable as against public policy.67 Some courts, however,
refuse to allow lawyers to invoke Rule 1.5(e) as a defense to breach of
contract claims by co-counsel. 46 Thus, a lawyer who violates Rule 1.5(e)
cannot use that violation as a shield to avoid sharing fees. 469 Other courts
allow recovery between lawyers based on quantum meruit even though their
agreement to divide fees violates Rule 1.5(e) or a similar rule.470 While
lawyers seeking fees from co-counsel based on quantum meruit naturally
must prove their entitlement to recovery, those denied compensation
462 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(e)(3) (20o9).
463 Id. at 1.5(a) (including, but not limited to, the time required, difficulty of the issues,
fee customarily charged, amount involved, time limitations imposed, nature and length of
professional relationship, and experience and reputation of the lawyer).
464 See Nunn Law Office v. Rosenthal, 905 N.E.zd 513, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (inter-
preting a similar provision in the Indiana rules); Diamond Point Plaza Ltd. P'ship v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 929 A.zd 932, 955 (Md. 2007) (interpreting a similar provision in the
Maryland rules).
465 See, e.g., In re Hart, 605 S.E.2d 532, 534 (S.C. 2004) (finding a violation even in the
absence of harm to the client).
466 Marcus v. Garland, Samuel & Loeb, P.C., 441 E Supp. zd 1227, 1230-31 (S.D. Fla.
zoo6) (citing Chandris, S.A. v. Yanakakis, 668 So. zd 18o, 186 (Fla. 1996)); Paul B. Episcope,
Ltd. v. Law Offices of Campbell & Di Vincenzo, 869 N.E.2d 784, 792 (IIl. App. Ct. 2007);
Morris & Doherty, P.C. v. Lockwood, 672 N.W.zd 884,897 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003); Christensen
v. Eggen, 577 N.W.zd 221, 225 (Minn. 1998); Neilson v. McCloskey, 186 S.W.3d 285, 287 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2005); Kalled v. Albee, 712 A.zd 616, 618 (N.H. 1998) (citing Schniederjon v. Krupa,
514 N.E.2d 1200, 1202 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987)).
467 Evans & Luptak, PLC v. Lizza, 65o N.W.2d 364, 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 2oo2); Dardas
v. Fleming, Hovenkamp & Grayson, P.C., 194 S.W.3d 6o3, 613 (Tex. App. zoo6).
468 See, e.g., Freeman v. Mayer, 95 E3d 569, 575-76 (7th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Indiana
law).
469 Id. at 576.
470 See, e.g., Ballow Brasted O'Brien & Rusin P.C. v. Logan, 435 E3d 235, 242-43 (2d Cir.
2oo6) (applying New York law); Huskinson & Brown, LLP v. Wolf, 84 P.3d 379, 382-85 (Cal.
2004); Carr v. Pearman, 86o N.E.2d 863, 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Whalen v. Murphy, 943 So.
2d 504, 507-08 (La. Ct. App. 2oo6); Kaled, 712 A.zd at 618.
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because of an unenforceable agreement to divide fees may not recover any
fees they claim to be owed directly from the client.47'
Again, fee disputes between co-counsel are common and often ugly.
Brown &Bain, PA. v. O'Quinn, in which a large Phoenix law firm and Texas
trial lawyer John O'Quinn squared off, is a recent high-profile example.
42
The events leading up to the decision in Brown & Bain began in 1991,
when over 900 people in the Phoenix area joined in a class action lawsuit
against Motorola known as Mclntire.473 O'Quinn took over the case in 1993
when the plaintiffs' prior firm dissolved. 4 4 The Mclntire plaintiffs agreed
that O'Quinn would receive a forty percent contingent fee and that they
were to receive sixty percent of the total recovery or settlement, less costs
and expenses. 475 In April 1993, O'Quinn engaged the Phoenix law firm of
Brown & Bain to assist in the suit.476 Their engagement agreement provided
that Brown & Bain would be paid $135 per hour for attorneys' time and
$45 per hour for paralegals' time at what the parties called the "discount
rate." 477 The agreement further provided that Brown & Bain would
receive additional payments upon termination of the action calculated at
$155.25 per hour for attorneys' time and $51.75 per hour for paralegals'
time if certain conditions for recovery were met.478 Basically, O'Quinn and
other lawyers working on the case had to recover more than the cost of
the discount rate payments from the proceeds of the litigation, after which
Brown & Bain would receive additional payments in accordance with a
specified formula.4 9 Brown & Bain eventually billed just under $2.921
million for its work on the Mclntire case at the discount rate.
480
In 1998, Brown & Bain and O'Quinn parted ways; Brown & Bain claimed
that it withdrew because its role in the case was being "marginalized," while
O'Quinn contended that the firm got cold feet when success in the Mclntire
case seemed doubtful.41 Whatever the reason, Brown & Bain withdrew
without opposition from O'Quinn and was replaced by a small firm, Allen
& Price, which was formed by two former Brown & Bain partners, one
471 Strong v. Beydoun, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 632, 635-36 (Cal. Ct. App. zoo8).
472 Brown & Bain, PA. v. O'Quinn, 518 E3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2oo8).
473 Id. at 1038.
474 Id.
475 Id.
476 Id.
477 Id.
478 Id.
479 Id. ("[T]he remainder of [the] respective recoveries [were to] be divided one-half to
[O'Quinn] and the other plaintiffs' counsel working on the matter and one-half to Brown &
Bain until [its] additional payments [had] been fully paid.").
480 Id.
481 Id.
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of whom had worked on the Mclntire case.48 Somewhere along the way,
O'Quinn opened his own Phoenix office, which curiously billed hourly fees
of nearly $4.6 million and expenses of nearly $3 million in connection with
the Mclntire litigation.'
O'Quinn settled the Mclntire case in 2002 for just over $26.3 million.'
O'Quinn treated roughly $13.7 million of this amount as "costs chargeable
to its clients" (including more than $7 million in salaries and expenses for
his Phoenix office). 48s After also drawing his $10.1 million contingent fee,
O'Quinn paid the plaintiffs just under $2.5 million.486 When Brown & Bain
asked to be paid the additional fees called for by its engagement agreement,
O'Quinn, who had made out like a bandit, refused.48 7 Brown & Bain sued
to recover its additional fees and won, but O'Quinn then appealed to the
Ninth Circuit.488
O'Quinn claimed that he had no obligation to pay additional fees to
Brown & Bain because he had actually lost roughly $3 million on the
Mclntire case, which he calculated based on his claimed expenses of over
$13 million versus his contingent fee of just over $10 million.489 This was
a patently absurd argument. It was obvious that O'Quinn's $10.1 million
contingent fee far exceeded Brown & Bain's discount rate fee, and O'Quinn
was thus obligated to pay Brown & Bain the additional fees due under their
agreement.
490
O'Quinn's fallback position was that Brown & Bain's additional fee
request was ethically improper. O'Quinn's expert, Professor Geoffrey
Hazard, had opined that Brown & Bain's additional compensation would
violate Arizona Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5 by being unreasonable.491
As Hazard conveniently saw it, O'Quinn had lost approximately $3.2 million
on the case, while Brown & Bain's recovery of additional fees would push
its total compensation to $6.2 million.49 In Hazard's opinion, this disparity
rendered Brown & Bain's fees unreasonable under Rule 1.5. 93 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed. It explained that Rule 1.5 governs the reasonableness of
fees charged to clients; it does not control fee disputes between lawyers.494
482 Id. at 1038-39.
483 Id. at 1039.
484 Id.
485 Id. at 1039-41.
486 Id. at io39.
487 Id.
488 Id.
489 Id. at io4o.
490 Id.
491 Id. at Io4I.
492 Id.
493 Id.
494 Id.
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Brown & Bain's additional fees would come out of O'Quinn's contingent fee
and would therefore have no effect on the fees charged to the clients.4 9
Hazard also opined that Brown & Bain was not entitled to additional
fees because the firm's withdrawal amounted to "quitting," and thus was "a
breach of its contractual obligations with O'Quinn. '49 6 He further suggested
that in withdrawing, Brown & Bain had failed to consider its clients'
interests. 497 Unfortunately for O'Quinn, he offered no evidence that Brown
& Bain's withdrawal burdened a single client.4 9 To the contrary, the firm
gave "ample notice of its desire to withdraw" and arranged for substitute
counsel.499 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment for Brown
& Bain.s°°
Brown & Bain amply illustrates lawyers behaving like scorpions in a
bottle. O'Quinn received a $10.1 million fee, plus he had no overhead
associated with the case, because he also charged his clients hourly to cover
his firm's salaries and office expenses."1 Thus, his $10.1 million fee was
the purest of pure profit. He still could not bring himself to share any of it
with Brown & Bain, despite their contract. Brown & Bain, which had a fight
forced upon it, nonetheless managed to get its pincers on some $3 million
in extra cash despite withdrawing from the representation. The clients,
who almost as an afterthought received on average a paltry $2100 each, 02
were left to marvel at their lawyers' battle.
CONCLUSION
Co-counsel relationships offer many substantial advantages to
clients. Clients are often best served by the involvement of specialists
in their representations, and co-counsel arrangements allow for that while
permitting the continued involvement of clients' regular counsel, whom
they trust and who are familiar with their affairs or special requirements.
In other instances, co-counsel relationships provide clients with local
access, knowledge, or insight unavailable from their other counsel, no
matter how skilled or diligent they may be. On the other side of the coin,
co-counsel affiliations greatly benefit lawyers by allowing them to accept
representations for which they would otherwise be unqualified, or which
they would otherwise have to decline because of a lack of time or resources.
For all these reasons, co-counsel relationships are extremely common in
495 Id.
496 Id.
497 See id.
498 Id. at 1042.
499 Id.
5oo Id.
501 Id. at 1041.
502 Id.
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many areas of the law.
Despite their many advantages, co-counsel relationships sometimes go
terribly awry and the lawyers, who initially saw themselves as joint venturers
in beneficial and profitable service to their mutual client, wind up pitted
against one another like scorpions in a bottle. Some common subjects of
dispute have gained little traction. For example, courts have been unwilling
to recognize legal malpractice or breach of fiduciary duty claims between
co-counsel. Local counsel generally have no duty to ensure lead counsel's
competence or diligence. On the other hand, courts have been willing to
permit contribution and indemnity claims between co-counsel. Moreover,
many states have yet to address key areas or subjects of dispute between
co-counsel, meaning that the law remains unsettled.
Because co-counsel representations will remain an important feature on
the legal landscape for years to come, it is important for courts and lawyers
to understand the professional liability and responsibility traps common
to them. These subjects have so far received little scholarly attention and
merit far more.

